**Cartelization in India’s Core Input Sector: A Case-cum-Research Analysis of the CCI’s Steel Price-Fixing Order (2015–2023)**

**Cartelization in India’s Core Input Sector:

A Case-cum-Research Analysis of the CCI’s Steel Price-Fixing Order (2015–2023)** 

Abstract

The Competition Commission of India’s (CCI) October 6, 2025 order—finding that 28 steel producers, including Tata Steel, JSW Steel, SAIL and Rashtriya Ispat Nigam, engaged in price-fixing cartel behaviour between 2015 and 2023—marks one of the most consequential antitrust interventions in India’s industrial history. By holding 56 senior executives personally liable under Section 48 of the Competition Act, 2002, the CCI has signalled a decisive shift toward individual accountability and enhanced deterrence in core input sectors.
This case-cum-research paper analyses the factual background, legal framework, economic implications and policy consequences of the steel cartel case. It situates the order within India’s evolving competition law regime, compares it with international cartel enforcement in heavy industries, and evaluates its implications for infrastructure costs, industrial policy and corporate governance. The paper contributes to the literature on antitrust enforcement in emerging economies by examining how regulators balance deterrence with developmental objectives in strategically vital sectors.

Keywords: Cartelisation, Competition Commission of India, Steel Industry, Price Fixing, Section 3, Section 48, Industrial Policy, Antitrust Enforcement

 

1. Introduction

Competition law enforcement in India has gradually shifted from a formative, advisory role to a more assertive deterrence-oriented regime. The steel cartel order of October 6, 2025 represents a watershed moment in this evolution. Unlike earlier cases that largely focused on mid-sized industries or trade associations, the present matter involves India’s largest private and public steel producers—entities central to infrastructure, manufacturing and national development.

Steel occupies a unique position as a “gateway input”: its price directly affects roads, railways, housing, automobiles, capital goods and defence production. Allegations of coordinated pricing in such a sector therefore raise concerns not merely of consumer harm, but of macroeconomic distortion and fiscal stress. The case also tests the credibility of India’s competition law framework when enforcement collides with industrial policy goals and public-sector ownership.

This paper frames the CCI steel order as a major institutional test for Indian antitrust law and examines its broader legal, economic and governance ramifications.

 

2. Case Background

2.1 Genesis of the Investigation

The investigation originated from complaints filed by road and highway builders’ associations, who alleged that prices of steel rebars and structural products were increasing in a synchronized manner without corresponding changes in cost structures. These complaints gained prominence during 2020–2021, a period marked by volatile construction demand and pandemic-related disruptions.

Initially raised before a criminal court in Gujarat, the matter was redirected to the Competition Commission of India after the public prosecutor indicated that the allegations fell squarely within antitrust jurisdiction. Acting on judicial directions, the CCI initiated a formal investigation in 2021.

2.2 Scope and Duration

The probe expanded significantly in scale and scope. Ultimately, it covered approximately 31 companies and industry bodies and examined conduct spanning 2015 to 2023. The CCI’s October 6, 2025 order finds 28 companies guilty of contravention, including:

• Tata Steel
• JSW Steel
• Steel Authority of India Ltd. (SAIL)
• Rashtriya Ispat Nigam Ltd. (RINL)
• Shyam Steel and other regional players

In addition to corporate liability, 56 senior executives were held personally responsible for their roles during various phases of the cartel period.

 

3. Legal Framework and Findings

3.1 Section 3 of the Competition Act, 2002

The principal legal provision invoked is Section 3, which prohibits anti-competitive agreements that cause or are likely to cause an appreciable adverse effect on competition (AAEC). Cartel agreements relating to price-fixing, output restriction and market allocation are presumed to cause AAEC.

The CCI rejected arguments that the observed price movements amounted to lawful “conscious parallelism,” holding instead that the evidence demonstrated explicit coordination.

3.2 Penalties under Section 27(b)

Under the proviso to Section 27(b), in cartel cases the CCI may impose penalties of up to:

• Three times the profit, or
• 10% of turnover,
  for each year of infringement, whichever is higher.

The Commission directed the companies to submit audited financial statements for eight financial years up to 2022–23, signalling an intention to compute penalties over the full duration of the cartel.

3.3 Individual Liability under Section 48

A defining feature of the order is the invocation of Section 48, under which individuals in charge of and responsible for the conduct of business may be held liable. Those named reportedly include:

• Sajjan Jindal (Managing Director, JSW Steel)
• T. V. Narendran (CEO, Tata Steel)
• Four former chairpersons of SAIL

This approach underscores a shift from entity-centric enforcement to personal accountability at the highest managerial levels.

 

4. Evidence and Investigative Process

4.1 Digital Communications as Evidence

According to internal CCI documents cited in public reports, investigators uncovered WhatsApp chats and electronic communications among regional steel producer groups. These communications reportedly discussed:

• Common pricing strategies
• Coordination of price announcements
• Supply discipline and possible production moderation

The CCI treated these exchanges as direct evidence of collusion rather than benign industry discussions.

4.2 Role of Trade Associations

The investigation also examined the role of regional industry associations as potential facilitators of coordination, raising concerns about “hub-and-spoke” arrangements where associations act as conduits for cartel conduct.

 

5. Market Context and Parties Involved

JSW Steel and Tata Steel are among India’s largest private steel producers, with standalone revenues of approximately USD 14–15 billion each in FY 2024–25. SAIL and RINL represent major public-sector capacity, particularly critical for infrastructure and railways.

Collectively, the implicated firms account for a substantial share of India’s crude and finished steel capacity. Such concentration creates structural conditions conducive to coordinated behaviour, particularly in standardized products like rebars and structural steel.

 

6. Economic Analysis and Impact

6.1 Impact on Infrastructure and Manufacturing

Steel price increases during the cartel period likely translated into higher costs for public infrastructure projects. Given steel’s significant share in construction costs, even modest collusive mark-ups can lead to substantial fiscal overruns or project rationalisation.

6.2 Interaction with Global Price Volatility

The cartel period overlaps with major global shocks, including the Covid-19 pandemic and post-pandemic commodity volatility. This environment may have allowed coordinated price increases to be masked as responses to global trends, complicating detection.

6.3 Financial Implications of Penalties

If penalties approach statutory maxima, total sanctions could amount to several thousand crore rupees, affecting balance sheets, investment plans and deleveraging strategies. The case therefore raises important questions about the trade-off between deterrence and investment capacity in capital-intensive industries.

 

7. Behavioural, Governance and Compliance Dimensions

The personal liability imposed on senior executives is likely to have far-reaching governance consequences. Boards and top management will be compelled to treat competition compliance as a strategic risk rather than a legal formality.

Key implications include:

• Formal competition compliance programmes
• Restrictions on informal communications with competitors
• Enhanced oversight of trade association participation
• Dawn-raid preparedness and internal audit trails for pricing decisions

The case illustrates how digital communication platforms, while operationally efficient, can become powerful sources of incriminating evidence.

 

8. Policy and Regulatory Implications

8.1 Deterrence Signal Across Industries

A high-profile enforcement action in steel sends a strong signal to other concentrated input sectors such as cement, fertilizers and petrochemicals, where allegations of price parallelism are common.

8.2 Public Sector Undertakings and Dual Roles

The involvement of PSUs such as SAIL and RINL raises sensitive questions about the state’s dual role as regulator and owner. It may necessitate renewed focus on governance autonomy and competition compliance within public enterprises.

8.3 Alignment with Updated Penalty Guidelines

The case aligns with India’s updated penalty guidelines, which emphasise relevant turnover and calibrated yet stringent sanctions for serious cartels.

 

9. Comparative Perspective

Compared with EU and US cartel cases in heavy industries, the CCI’s reliance on digital communications and individual liability reflects convergence with global best practices. However, the Indian context differs in its simultaneous pursuit of industrial expansion and competition enforcement, making the balancing act more complex.

 

10. Research Directions and Questions

Future empirical and doctrinal research may address:

1. Price-Cost Analysis: Did Indian steel prices deviate significantly from global benchmarks during 2015–2023, and can such deviations be econometrically linked to collusion?
2. Evidence Standards: How does the CCI’s treatment of digital communications compare with EU and US jurisprudence?
3. Developmental Impact: What are the long-term effects of large antitrust penalties on investment, employment and capacity creation in emerging economies?

 

11. Conclusion

The CCI’s steel cartel order represents a decisive moment in Indian competition law enforcement. By targeting both corporations and individuals in a strategically vital sector, the Commission has reinforced the principle that no industry is too important to comply with competition norms. The case will shape corporate behaviour, regulatory strategy and academic debate on antitrust enforcement in emerging economies for years to come.

 

References

·         Competition Commission of India. (2009). Competition Act, 2002. Government of India.

·         Competition Commission of India. (2023). Penalty Guidelines under the Competition Act, 2002. New Delhi: CCI.

·         Connor, J. M., & Lande, R. H. (2012). Cartels as rational business strategy. Northwestern Journal of International Law & Business, 34(3), 427–490.

·         European Commission. (2020). Guidelines on the application of Article 101 TFEU. Brussels.

·         Motta, M. (2004). Competition policy: Theory and practice. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

·         OECD. (2019). Hard core cartels: Third report on the implementation of the 1998 recommendation. Paris: OECD Publishing.