INDIA, BRICS AND THE NEW PAYMENT ARCHITECTURE
From
Dollar Dominance to Digital-Rupee Connectivity: A Case-Cum-Research Analysis of
UPI, Local Currencies and BRICS Payment Reform

Abstract
The international payment system is
undergoing gradual diversification rather than an immediate replacement of the
US dollar. This case-cum-research paper examines India's position in this
transformation through the interaction of five elements: US-dollar dominance,
BRICS payment initiatives, local-currency settlement, India's Unified Payments
Interface (UPI), and the widespread but factually problematic reference to
“KITO currency.” The evidence in the case indicates that KITO is not a
recognised international trade or BRICS settlement currency and should not be
confused with KAITO or established national currencies.
The study analyses the potential of
interoperable payment systems to reduce transaction friction while recognising
that payment technology cannot independently eliminate foreign-exchange risk,
liquidity constraints, regulatory differences, cybersecurity threats or
geopolitical pressures. The paper develops a statistical-analysis framework
around five proposed relationships: payment interoperability and transaction
efficiency; local-currency settlement and dollar-conversion dependence; UPI and
cross-border payment accessibility; payment diversification and strategic
flexibility; and institutional trust/liquidity and adoption intention.
The case suggests that India's
opportunity lies less in replacing the dollar and more in creating a multi-rail
international payment architecture in which UPI, rupee settlement,
bilateral arrangements, BRICS-linked infrastructure and established dollar
markets coexist.
Keywords: BRICS, UPI, US dollar, rupee internationalisation,
local-currency settlement, cross-border payments, KITO, KAITO, digital
payments, India.
1. Introduction
International trade has
traditionally depended heavily on established banking networks, correspondent
banking relationships and major international currencies. The US dollar
continues to occupy a central position because of its financial-market depth,
liquidity, reserve-asset availability, international invoicing and network
effects. The uploaded case reports that the dollar represented approximately
58% of disclosed global official foreign-exchange reserves in 2024.
At the same time, BRICS countries
have increasingly explored local-currency settlement, payment-system
interoperability and mechanisms designed to make cross-border transactions
faster, cheaper and more resilient. The case specifically identifies national
payment systems, local currencies, correspondent banking, digital currencies
and cross-border settlement as the major components of this transformation.
A major conceptual problem has
emerged in public discussion: currencies, payment systems and cryptocurrencies
are frequently treated as interchangeable. They are not.
The US dollar is a sovereign
currency and major reserve asset. UPI is a payment infrastructure. BRICS
payment initiatives concern settlement and interoperability. KITO, according to
the case evidence, is a small cryptocurrency token rather than a major
international currency. KAITO is a separate cryptoasset.
This distinction forms the starting
point of the present research.
2. The Central Case
2.1
The “KITO currency” confusion
The case investigates the claim that
KITO is somehow connected with US–China trade, BRICS settlement or American
economic leadership.
The available evidence presented in
the source material does not support that claim. KITO is described as a small
cryptocurrency token, while KAITO is a separate cryptoasset. Neither is identified
as a BRICS settlement currency, US government currency, Federal Reserve
instrument or major global trade currency.
This distinction is important
because confusing a cryptocurrency token with a payment rail or sovereign
currency can fundamentally distort an analysis of international monetary power.
3. What Actually Supports Dollar Dominance?
The case identifies a
multidimensional foundation of US financial influence.
|
Dimension |
Role |
|
Economic scale |
Large production and consumption
base |
|
Network effects |
International participants already
use dollars |
|
Financial-market depth |
Large and liquid financial markets |
|
Treasury-market liquidity |
Availability of highly traded
dollar assets |
|
Trade invoicing |
International contracts frequently
use dollars |
|
Financial infrastructure |
Extensive banking and settlement
ecosystem |
|
Institutional capacity |
Developed financial and
technological institutions |
|
Geopolitical relationships |
International alliances and
economic relationships |
The implication is significant: a
payment application cannot by itself replace a reserve currency.
The dollar's international role is
systemic rather than technological.
4. US–China Trade as the Strategic Context
China has developed substantial
financial infrastructure supporting greater international use of the renminbi,
including CIPS. Russia has developed SPFS, while India has promoted rupee
settlement and UPI. Brazil's Pix represents another large-scale domestic
digital-payment infrastructure.
However, the existence of
alternative payment infrastructure does not mean that the dollar automatically
disappears.
A company may conduct one
transaction in yuan, another in dollars and another through a bilateral local-currency
mechanism.
Therefore:
Payment-system diversification ≠
currency replacement.
5. BRICS Payment Architecture
The case identifies seven principal
areas of BRICS payment cooperation:
National-currency use
Local-currency settlement
Linking domestic payment systems
Correspondent banking cooperation
CBDC interoperability
Reduction of transaction costs
Greater payment resilience
The 2024 Kazan Declaration is
described in the source material as supporting faster, cheaper, safer and more
inclusive cross-border payments and welcoming local-currency use. The source
also emphasises that the BRICS Cross-Border Payments Initiative was voluntary
and non-binding.
This is analytically different from
establishing a single BRICS currency.
6. UPI as India's Strategic Payment Infrastructure
UPI is not a currency.
It is a payment rail.
This distinction is central to the
research model.
The source material notes that NPCI
International Payments Limited has worked to deploy UPI and RuPay
internationally and identifies international acceptance/cooperation involving
countries and territories including Bhutan, France, Mauritius, Nepal,
Singapore, Sri Lanka and the UAE, depending on the specific implementation.
UPI can potentially support:
tourism;
remittances;
education payments;
e-commerce;
small-value business transactions;
digital services;
small exporters.
However, UPI does not eliminate
foreign-exchange conversion or settlement requirements.
7. Case Illustration: Indian Machinery Importer and
Brazil
Consider an Indian machinery
importer purchasing equipment from Brazil.
Conventional
model
Indian Rupee → Bank → Foreign
exchange → Dollar/intermediary banking → Brazilian bank → Brazilian Real
Potential friction includes:
intermediary banks;
currency conversion;
compliance;
settlement time;
fees;
liquidity requirements.
Interoperable
model
Indian buyer → UPI-linked interface
→ INR settlement → FX mechanism → Brazilian payment system → BRL
The case explains that such a system
could reduce transaction friction, but exchange-rate determination, liquidity,
fraud prevention, compliance and final settlement would remain necessary.
8. Research Problem
Research
Problem
To what extent can India's UPI,
local-currency settlement and BRICS payment interoperability improve
cross-border transaction efficiency while preserving financial stability and
strategic flexibility?
9. Research Objectives
The study has six objectives:
To clarify the distinction between KITO, KAITO, currencies
and payment systems.
To examine the structural foundations of US-dollar
dominance.
To examine BRICS payment diversification.
To analyse UPI's potential international role.
To examine the relationship between payment interoperability
and transaction efficiency.
To identify the financial, technological and geopolitical
constraints affecting India's gains.
10. Research Questions
RQ1: Is KITO a recognised international trade or BRICS
settlement currency?
RQ2: Can UPI facilitate selected cross-border transactions?
RQ3: Does local-currency settlement reduce dependence on dollar
conversion?
RQ4: Does payment interoperability improve transaction
efficiency?
RQ5: What factors determine adoption of alternative payment
infrastructure?
RQ6: Can BRICS payment diversification coexist with continued
dollar use?
11. Conceptual Research Model
The paper develops the following
analytical model:
Payment Interoperability
↓
Transaction Speed + Cost Efficiency
+ Accessibility
↓
Cross-Border Payment Adoption
↓
Local-Currency Settlement
↓
Reduced Selected Dollar-Conversion
Dependence
↓
Greater Rupee Internationalisation
↓
India's Strategic Payment
Flexibility
But the relationship is moderated
by:
FX Risk + Liquidity + Regulation +
Cybersecurity + Trust + Geopolitical Risk
This means that technological
efficiency does not automatically produce monetary internationalisation.
12. Hypotheses
H1
Payment interoperability has a
positive relationship with perceived cross-border transaction efficiency.
H2
Greater use of local-currency
settlement is associated with lower dependence on dollar conversion in selected
bilateral transactions.
H3
Greater awareness and usability of
UPI are positively associated with willingness to use UPI-linked cross-border
payments.
H4
Institutional trust is positively
associated with adoption intention for cross-border digital payment systems.
H5
Perceived foreign-exchange and
regulatory risks negatively influence adoption intention.
H6
Payment interoperability has a
positive relationship with perceived strategic flexibility for Indian
businesses.
13. Variables and Measurement Framework
|
Variable |
Type |
Possible
indicators |
|
Payment interoperability |
Independent |
Connectivity, compatibility,
accessibility |
|
Transaction efficiency |
Dependent |
Cost, speed, settlement time |
|
UPI usability |
Independent |
Ease, convenience, familiarity |
|
Local-currency settlement |
Independent |
INR acceptance, conversion
reduction |
|
Institutional trust |
Moderator |
Banking confidence, regulatory
trust |
|
FX risk |
Moderator |
Exchange-rate uncertainty |
|
Regulatory complexity |
Moderator |
KYC, AML, taxation |
|
Cybersecurity concern |
Moderator |
Fraud, data protection |
|
Adoption intention |
Dependent |
Willingness to use |
|
Strategic flexibility |
Dependent |
Payment choice, diversification |
A five-point Likert scale can be
used for empirical testing:
1 = Strongly Disagree
2 = Disagree
3 = Neutral
4 = Agree
5 = Strongly Agree
14. Statistical Analysis Framework
Because the supplied case contains qualitative/policy
evidence rather than a respondent-level dataset, the following statistical
section is presented as the proper empirical design and analysis structure,
not as fabricated survey results. The source itself explicitly describes the
methodology as qualitative case-study and policy analysis.
14.1
Descriptive Statistics
The empirical study should first
calculate:
Frequency
Percentage
Mean
Standard deviation
Minimum
Maximum
For example:
|
Variable |
Mean |
SD |
Interpretation |
|
UPI usability |
To be calculated |
To be calculated |
Survey dependent |
|
Payment efficiency |
To be calculated |
To be calculated |
Survey dependent |
|
Local-currency awareness |
To be calculated |
To be calculated |
Survey dependent |
|
FX-risk concern |
To be calculated |
To be calculated |
Survey dependent |
|
Cybersecurity concern |
To be calculated |
To be calculated |
Survey dependent |
|
Adoption intention |
To be calculated |
To be calculated |
Survey dependent |
15. Reliability Analysis
For a primary survey, Cronbach's
Alpha should be calculated for multi-item constructs.
Formula
α = [k/(k−1)] [1 − Σσ²áµ¢ / σ²â‚œ]
where:
k = number of items;
σ²áµ¢ =
variance of each item;
σ²â‚œ =
variance of the total score.
The purpose is to establish internal
consistency among questionnaire items.
A commonly used research convention
is:
|
Alpha |
Interpretation |
|
< 0.60 |
Low |
|
0.60–0.69 |
Marginal |
|
0.70–0.79 |
Acceptable |
|
0.80–0.89 |
Good |
|
≥0.90 |
Very high |
These are methodological benchmarks,
not results from the supplied case.
16. Chi-Square Analysis
A Chi-square test of independence
can test whether categorical variables are associated.
Example
UPI awareness × Willingness to use
cross-border UPI
|
Willing |
Not
willing |
|
|
High awareness |
O₁ |
O₂ |
|
Low awareness |
O₃ |
O₄ |
Hypothesis
H₀: UPI awareness and adoption intention are independent.
H₁: UPI awareness and adoption intention are associated.
Decision rule:
p < 0.05 → reject H₀
p ≥ 0.05 → fail to reject H₀
The actual χ² value and p-value must
come from collected observations.
17. Independent-Samples t-Test
A t-test can compare the mean
adoption intention of two groups.
Example
Group A: Businesses with international-payment experience
Group B: Businesses without international-payment experience
Dependent variable:
Cross-border payment adoption
intention
The test examines whether the
observed mean difference is statistically significant.
Again, an actual t-statistic and
significance value cannot legitimately be supplied without respondent-level
observations.
18. ANOVA
One-way ANOVA can examine whether
adoption intention differs across more than two categories.
For example:
Business size
Micro
Small
Medium
Large
Dependent variable:
Cross-border payment adoption
intention
Hypothesis
H₀: Mean adoption intention is equal across all business-size
groups.
H₁: At least one group has a different mean.
If the ANOVA is significant,
post-hoc testing such as Tukey's HSD can identify which groups differ.
19. Correlation Analysis
Pearson correlation can examine
relationships among the major constructs.
|
Variables |
Expected
relationship |
|
UPI usability ↔ adoption intention |
Positive |
|
Payment efficiency ↔ adoption
intention |
Positive |
|
Institutional trust ↔ adoption
intention |
Positive |
|
FX risk ↔ adoption intention |
Negative |
|
Cybersecurity concern ↔ adoption
intention |
Negative |
|
Regulatory complexity ↔ adoption
intention |
Negative |
The correlation coefficient ranges
from:
−1 to +1
A positive coefficient indicates
that the variables move in the same direction, while a negative coefficient
indicates an inverse relationship.
20. Multiple Regression Model
The principal empirical model can be
expressed as:
AI = β₀ + β₁PI + β₂UPI + β₃TR +
β₄FXR + β₅CSR + β₆REG + ε
Where:
AI = Adoption Intention
PI = Payment Interoperability
UPI = UPI
Usability
TR = Institutional Trust
FXR =
Foreign-Exchange Risk
CSR =
Cybersecurity Risk
REG =
Regulatory Complexity
ε = Error term
The regression would establish which
factors significantly explain variation in adoption intention.
21. Expected Statistical Interpretation
The conceptual relationships
developed from the case are:
Payment interoperability → (+) →
efficiency
UPI usability → (+) → adoption
Institutional trust → (+) → adoption
FX risk → (−) → adoption
Cybersecurity risk → (−) → adoption
Regulatory complexity → (−) →
adoption
These are research hypotheses,
not claimed statistical findings.
22. Factor Analysis
Exploratory Factor Analysis can reduce
numerous questionnaire items into underlying dimensions.
Potential factors emerging from the
research framework are:
Factor
1 — Digital Efficiency
Speed
Convenience
Accessibility
Low transaction cost
Factor
2 — Financial Confidence
Exchange-rate confidence
Liquidity
Settlement certainty
Banking reliability
Factor
3 — Institutional Trust
Regulatory confidence
Consumer protection
Data protection
Legal certainty
Factor
4 — Risk Perception
Cybersecurity
Fraud
Sanctions
Regulatory uncertainty
Factor
5 — Strategic Adoption
UPI usage
Local-currency settlement
Cross-border expansion
Payment diversification
KMO and Bartlett's test should
precede factor extraction.
23. Strategic Case Analysis
The case produces five strategic
dimensions:
|
Dimension |
Opportunity |
Constraint |
|
UPI |
Fast digital payments |
Not a currency |
|
Rupee settlement |
Greater INR usage |
Liquidity/convertibility |
|
BRICS cooperation |
Diversification |
Political differences |
|
Local currencies |
Reduced selected conversion |
FX risk |
|
Dollar system |
Liquidity and global acceptance |
Concentration/dependence |
This demonstrates that India does
not face a simple “Dollar versus BRICS” choice.
Instead, the emerging architecture
can be represented as:
Dollar Network
↕
Regional Currency Networks
↕
BRICS Payment Cooperation
↕
UPI / National Payment Rails
↕
Businesses / Consumers
24. Major Risks
The case identifies seven major
categories of risk.
24.1
Foreign-exchange risk
Local-currency settlement does not
eliminate currency volatility.
24.2
Liquidity risk
A foreign company accepting rupees
needs economically useful ways to hold, spend or invest those rupees.
24.3
Trade imbalance
Persistent bilateral trade
imbalances can make local-currency accumulation unattractive.
24.4
Cybersecurity risk
Cross-border interoperability
creates additional attack surfaces, including identity theft, QR fraud, malware
and system disruption.
24.5
Data-governance risk
Payment information can reveal
individuals, businesses, supply chains and strategic trade relationships.
24.6
Regulatory risk
KYC, AML, sanctions, tax,
foreign-exchange and consumer-protection requirements must operate across
jurisdictions.
24.7
Geopolitical risk
Companies may consider exposure to
sanctions, dollar-market restrictions and compliance penalties when selecting
payment channels.
25. Scenario Analysis
|
Scenario |
Core
characteristic |
Indian
implication |
|
Limited interoperability |
Selected foreign connections |
Moderate opportunity |
|
Local-currency expansion |
More bilateral INR settlement |
Greater currency-management
requirement |
|
BRICS payment bridge |
Multiple national systems
interconnected |
Greater technological opportunity
and governance complexity |
|
Common BRICS currency |
Shared settlement unit |
Major institutional challenge |
|
Fragmented payment blocs |
Several competing systems |
Higher compliance complexity |
|
Multi-system coexistence |
Dollar remains important while
alternatives expand |
Diversified payment choices |
The source material describes the
final scenario as the most plausible, while also emphasising that the dollar
remains substantially ahead of other currencies in reserve usage.
26. India's Strategic Opportunity
The case identifies several areas
where Indian businesses may benefit:
Exporters
Lower payment friction can improve
working-capital cycles.
MSMEs
Smaller businesses may obtain easier
access to international customers.
Tourism
Foreign visitors can potentially use
connected digital-payment systems.
Remittances
Digital interoperability could
reduce friction in selected corridors.
Fintech
Indian payment companies may obtain
international infrastructure opportunities.
Banking
Indian banks can develop
international rupee settlement and payment services.
Digital
diplomacy
UPI can become part of India's
digital-public-infrastructure partnerships.
The source specifically identifies
SMEs, tourism, education, digital services, e-commerce, remittances and
agricultural/food exports as potential areas of application.
27. Proposed Empirical Sample
For conversion of this case into a
full empirical research paper, a survey can be conducted among:
Indian exporters;
importers;
MSME owners;
bankers;
fintech professionals;
international students;
remittance users;
international travellers;
financial experts.
Suggested
sample
N = 300–500 respondents
Sampling may use a combination of
purposive and stratified sampling.
28. Proposed Statistical Testing Matrix
|
Objective |
Variable
relationship |
Statistical
test |
|
Measure respondent profile |
Demographics |
Frequency/Percentage |
|
Measure construct reliability |
Survey items |
Cronbach Alpha |
|
Examine categorical association |
Awareness × adoption |
Chi-square |
|
Compare two groups |
International vs domestic firms |
t-test |
|
Compare 3+ groups |
Business-size categories |
ANOVA |
|
Examine relationships |
Major constructs |
Pearson correlation |
|
Predict adoption |
Multiple predictors |
Regression |
|
Identify dimensions |
20–30 questionnaire items |
Factor analysis |
|
Test integrated model |
Multiple latent constructs |
SEM |
29. Findings from the Case Evidence
The supplied case establishes six
substantive findings.
Finding 1: KITO is not established as a recognised international trade
currency.
Finding 2: Dollar dominance is supported by a broad economic and
financial ecosystem rather than a single technology.
Finding 3: BRICS payment cooperation is principally concerned with
diversification, local currencies and interoperability rather than an immediate
common currency.
Finding 4: UPI has potential as an international payment rail.
Finding 5: Payment interoperability cannot remove FX risk, liquidity
requirements, compliance or settlement issues.
Finding 6: India's major opportunity is increased payment and currency
diversification while retaining access to existing international financial
markets.
30. Managerial Implications
For
Indian exporters
Develop the ability to accept
multiple settlement currencies rather than depending exclusively on one
channel.
For
banks
Develop rupee liquidity, hedging and
cross-border settlement capabilities.
For
fintech companies
Focus on interoperability,
cybersecurity, fraud detection and regulatory technology.
For
MSMEs
Provide transparent FX pricing and
simplified international payment documentation.
For
regulators
Ensure that payment innovation
develops alongside AML, cybersecurity, consumer protection and data-governance
standards.
31. Policy Implications
The case supports a multi-rail
strategy rather than an either/or strategy.
India can simultaneously maintain:
Dollar access
Euro/other international currencies
Rupee settlement
UPI internationalisation
BRICS payment cooperation
Bilateral local-currency mechanisms
The source specifically recommends
preserving dollar-market access while expanding UPI, rupee liquidity and
practical local-currency arrangements.
32. Proposed Integrated Model: INDIA MULTI-RAIL
PAYMENT MODEL
IMPM
— India Multi-Rail Payment Model
Global Dollar Network
↓
International Trade & Finance
↕
BRICS Payment Connectivity
↕
Local-Currency Settlement
↕
Rupee Liquidity
↕
UPI / Digital Payment Infrastructure
↓
Indian MSMEs + Exporters + Tourists
+ Students + Remittance Users
Moderating
factors
Trust | Liquidity | FX Risk |
Regulation | Cybersecurity | Geopolitics
This model captures the central
conclusion of the case: India's objective need not be replacing one monetary
system with another; it can be expanding the number of efficient and reliable
payment channels available to Indian economic actors.
33. Limitations
The paper has several limitations.
First, BRICS payment arrangements
continue to evolve. Second, public announcements may not provide complete
technical implementation details. Third, local-currency settlement varies
across bilateral relationships. Fourth, cryptoasset data can change rapidly.
Finally, terms such as “BRICS Pay” can sometimes be used informally and should
not automatically be interpreted as evidence of one fully operational unified
BRICS network.
Most importantly, the supplied
material does not contain a primary respondent dataset. Therefore,
numerical statistical results such as α = 0.87, χ² = 14.32, p = 0.002, t =
3.41, etc. would be fabricated if presented as actual findings.
34. Conclusion
The central issue in the
international payment debate is not the emergence of a mysterious “KITO
currency.” The evidence supplied for this case does not establish KITO as a
recognised international trade or BRICS settlement currency. The substantive
transformation lies elsewhere: in the gradual development of local-currency
settlement, payment interoperability, digital public infrastructure and
alternative cross-border payment mechanisms.
For India, UPI provides an important
technological foundation, but UPI itself is not a currency and cannot
independently create reserve-currency status. Successful internationalisation
of the rupee requires liquidity, convertibility, financial-market depth,
institutional trust and effective regulation.
The research therefore conceptualises
India's future through a Multi-Rail Payment Model, in which the dollar,
rupee, local currencies, UPI and BRICS-linked payment infrastructure can
coexist.
The critical empirical question for
future research is not simply:
“Will BRICS replace the dollar?”
It is:
“Which combination of payment
infrastructure, currencies, liquidity, trust and regulation can reduce
cross-border transaction friction while maintaining financial stability?”
That question provides a stronger
foundation for an empirical study of India's emerging role in the international
payment architecture.
References
/ Source Base
Federal Reserve information on the international role of the
US dollar;
IMF-related reserve-currency information;
Bank for International Settlements analysis of cross-border
payments;
Reserve Bank of India publications on rupee
internationalisation and local-currency settlement;
NPCI information concerning international UPI deployment;
BRICS declarations and payment-related developments.
Appendix A — Secondary Data Bank for
Statistical Analysis
Table A1. International Role of Major
Currencies, 2024
|
Indicator |
US
Dollar |
Euro |
China/Renminbi |
|
International Currency Usage Index |
64.9 |
23.9 |
3.1 |
|
Share of Global GDP (%) |
26.1 |
14.9 |
16.8 |
|
Share of Global Trade (%) |
13.4 |
17.4 |
12.8 |
|
Official FX Reserves (%) |
57.8 |
19.8 |
2.2 |
|
International/Foreign-Currency Banking Claims (%) |
56.4 |
20.3 |
— |
|
International/Foreign-Currency Banking Liabilities
(%) |
63.2 |
16.3 |
— |
Source: Federal Reserve, The International Role of the
U.S. Dollar – 2025 Edition, using IMF, BIS, Refinitiv and related
datasets.
Interpretation
The data demonstrate an important structural feature of the international
monetary system. The United States accounted for 26.1% of global GDP in
2024, while the dollar's international currency-usage index was 64.9%.
China had a larger GDP share than the euro area but a substantially smaller
international-currency usage index.
This supports the argument that economic size alone does not
determine international currency status.
Table A2. US Dollar Share of Official
Foreign-Exchange Reserves
|
Year |
Dollar
(%) |
Euro
(%) |
Renminbi
(%) |
|
2001 |
71.5 |
19.2 |
— |
|
2005 |
66.5 |
23.9 |
— |
|
2010 |
62.3 |
25.8 |
— |
|
2015 |
65.8 |
19.2 |
— |
|
2020 |
58.9 |
21.3 |
2.3 |
|
2021 |
58.8 |
20.6 |
2.8 |
|
2022 |
58.4 |
20.5 |
2.7 |
|
2023 |
58.4 |
19.9 |
2.3 |
|
2024 |
57.8 |
19.8 |
2.2 |
Source: IMF COFER data reproduced in the Federal Reserve's
2025 analysis.
Statistical observation
From 2001 to 2024, the dollar's reserve share declined from 71.5% to
57.8%, a reduction of 13.7 percentage points.
However, the 2024 figure remains substantially higher than the euro's 19.8%
and renminbi's 2.2%.
Therefore, the data show diversification without disappearance of
dollar dominance.
Table A3. Dollar Banking-Currency Position,
2024
|
Category |
Dollar |
Euro |
Pound |
Yen |
|
International/foreign-currency banking claims |
56.4% |
20.3% |
5.4% |
4.9% |
|
International/foreign-currency banking liabilities |
63.2% |
16.3% |
4.0% |
4.8% |
Source: BIS locational banking statistics as reported by
Federal Reserve.
Interpretation
The banking data reinforce the reserve-data finding. The dollar is not
dominant merely because central banks hold dollars. It is also deeply embedded
in international borrowing, lending and deposit relationships.
Appendix B — India, UPI and Cross-Border
Payment Data
Table B1. UPI as an International Payment
Infrastructure
|
Dimension |
Evidence
from case |
|
Nature |
Instant-payment infrastructure |
|
Currency |
Not itself a currency |
|
Indian institution |
NPCI/NIPL ecosystem |
|
Main domestic strength |
Large-scale digital-payment adoption |
|
International role |
Cross-border payment connectivity |
|
Potential users |
Consumers, tourists, MSMEs, exporters |
|
Potential applications |
Tourism, remittances, e-commerce, education, small
trade |
|
Main limitation |
Does not eliminate FX conversion |
|
Major requirement |
Interoperability between national payment systems |
The original case correctly identifies UPI as a payment rail rather
than a currency.
Table B2. Project Nexus and UPI Connectivity
The BIS's Project Nexus provides an important real-world reference point for
analysing India's cross-border instant-payment strategy.
The BIS reported that the Nexus project aims to connect domestic
instant-payment systems internationally. The participating systems included
those of India, Malaysia, the Philippines, Singapore and Thailand, with the
project moving toward live implementation. India participates through UPI.
|
Component |
Role |
|
India |
UPI |
|
Malaysia |
Domestic instant-payment system |
|
Philippines |
Domestic instant-payment system |
|
Singapore |
Domestic instant-payment system |
|
Thailand |
Domestic instant-payment system |
|
BIS |
Coordination/advisory role |
|
Objective |
Cross-border instant-payment interoperability |
Research significance
This provides a concrete example of the principle underlying the paper:
Domestic digital payment infrastructure → interoperability →
cross-border payment capability
It is therefore stronger analytically than treating UPI internationalisation
as merely a theoretical possibility.
Appendix B3 — Quantitative
Dollar-Diversification Dataset
For statistical analysis, the following time series can be used directly.
|
Year |
USD
reserve share |
Euro |
RMB |
|
2015 |
65.8 |
19.2 |
1.1 |
|
2016 |
65.4 |
19.1 |
1.1 |
|
2017 |
62.7 |
20.2 |
1.2 |
|
2018 |
61.8 |
20.7 |
1.9 |
|
2019 |
60.8 |
20.6 |
1.9 |
|
2020 |
58.9 |
21.3 |
2.3 |
|
2021 |
58.8 |
20.6 |
2.8 |
|
2022 |
58.4 |
20.5 |
2.7 |
|
2023 |
58.4 |
19.9 |
2.3 |
|
2024 |
57.8 |
19.8 |
2.2 |
Source: IMF COFER/Federal Reserve accessible data.
Trend calculation
Dollar decline, 2015–2024:
65.8 − 57.8 = 8.0 percentage points
RMB increase, 2015–2024:
2.2 − 1.1 = 1.1 percentage points
Thus, the numerical evidence supports gradual diversification,
but it does not show a one-for-one transfer from dollars into renminbi.
Appendix B4 — International Currency Usage
Index
|
Year |
US
Dollar |
Euro |
China |
|
2022 |
65.9 |
24.5 |
2.7 |
|
2023 |
64.9 |
23.9 |
3.1 |
|
2024 |
66.6 |
23.8 |
2.6 |
Source: Federal Reserve calculation based on IMF, BIS,
Refinitiv and other sources.
Observation
The 2024 index is:
USA = 66.6
Euro area = 23.8
China = 2.6
This indicates that the international role of the dollar is much broader
than reserve holdings alone.
Appendix B5 — Statistical Comparison
Currency dominance ratio
Using the 2024 reserve shares:
Dollar / Euro = 57.8 / 19.8 = 2.92
Thus, the dollar's share of disclosed official reserves was approximately 2.9
times the euro's share.
Dollar / Renminbi
57.8 / 2.2 = 26.27
Thus, the dollar's reserve share was approximately 26 times the
renminbi's share in 2024.
This does not mean that the dollar is 26 times stronger as
a currency in every dimension; it refers specifically to the selected
reserve-share indicator.
Appendix B6 — Payment-System Analytical
Scorecard
For the research model, the major systems can be compared descriptively.
|
System |
Country/Region |
Primary
function |
Currency |
Cross-border
potential |
|
UPI |
India |
Instant payment |
INR-linked |
High |
|
CIPS |
China |
Interbank payment |
RMB |
High |
|
SPFS |
Russia |
Financial messaging |
Ruble/other |
Regional |
|
Pix |
Brazil |
Instant payment |
BRL |
Potentially high |
|
SWIFT |
Global |
Financial messaging |
Multi-currency |
Very high |
Important: “High” here describes the functional
scope/potential of the infrastructure, not a statistical ranking of
performance.
Appendix B7 — Proposed Empirical Dataset for
Primary Survey
If you want the paper to contain real SPSS statistical analysis,
Appendix B can additionally contain a respondent database.
Suggested sample: 500 respondents
|
Respondent
category |
Proposed
number |
|
Exporters |
100 |
|
Importers |
75 |
|
MSMEs |
100 |
|
Bank professionals |
75 |
|
Fintech professionals |
50 |
|
International students/travellers |
50 |
|
Remittance users |
50 |
|
Total |
500 |
This should be clearly labelled proposed sample until
actual questionnaires are collected.
Appendix B8 — Questionnaire Data Structure
Each respondent can be coded as follows:
|
Variable |
Code |
|
Respondent ID |
ID |
|
Age |
AGE |
|
Gender |
GEN |
|
Occupation |
OCC |
|
Business type |
BUS |
|
International transaction experience |
ITE |
|
UPI awareness |
UPIA |
|
UPI usability |
UPIU |
|
Payment efficiency |
PE |
|
Local-currency awareness |
LCA |
|
Institutional trust |
TRUST |
|
FX-risk concern |
FXR |
|
Cybersecurity concern |
CYBER |
|
Regulatory concern |
REG |
|
Adoption intention |
ADOPT |
|
Strategic flexibility |
SF |
Each attitudinal variable can be measured on a 1–5 Likert scale.
Appendix B9 — Statistical Hypothesis Testing
Table
|
Hypothesis |
Test |
Required
statistic |
Decision |
|
H1: Interoperability → efficiency |
Correlation/Regression |
r, β, p |
Based on actual data |
|
H2: Local currency → lower dollar conversion |
Correlation/Regression |
β, p |
Based on actual data |
|
H3: UPI usability → adoption |
Regression |
β, p |
Based on actual data |
|
H4: Trust → adoption |
Regression |
β, p |
Based on actual data |
|
H5: FX risk → adoption |
Regression |
β, p |
Based on actual data |
|
H6: Interoperability → strategic flexibility |
Regression |
β, p |
Based on actual data |
Appendix B10 — Recommended SPSS Output
Sequence
The final empirical paper should present the statistical analysis in this
order:
1. Demographic profile
↓
2. Descriptive statistics
↓
3. Reliability — Cronbach Alpha
↓
4. KMO + Bartlett's test
↓
5. Factor analysis
↓
6. Chi-square
↓
7. t-test
↓
8. ANOVA
↓
9. Pearson correlation
↓
10. Multiple regression
↓
11. Hypothesis decision table
↓
12. Integrated findings
Appendix
C — Statistical Analysis of the International Payment System
C1.
Dollar Reserve-Share Trend Analysis, 2015–2024
The Federal Reserve's 2025 dataset
provides annual IMF COFER data for major reserve currencies. The US-dollar
share fell from 65.8% in 2015 to 57.8% in 2024, while the renminbi
increased from 1.1% in 2016 to 2.2% in 2024.
|
Year |
USD
(%) |
Euro
(%) |
RMB
(%) |
|
2015 |
65.8 |
19.2 |
— |
|
2016 |
65.4 |
19.1 |
1.1 |
|
2017 |
62.7 |
20.2 |
1.2 |
|
2018 |
61.8 |
20.7 |
1.9 |
|
2019 |
60.8 |
20.6 |
1.9 |
|
2020 |
58.9 |
21.3 |
2.3 |
|
2021 |
58.8 |
20.6 |
2.8 |
|
2022 |
58.4 |
20.5 |
2.7 |
|
2023 |
58.4 |
19.9 |
2.3 |
|
2024 |
57.8 |
19.8 |
2.2 |
C2.
Change Analysis
Dollar change, 2015–2024
65.8 − 57.8 = 8.0 percentage
points decline
Percentage decline relative to 2015:
8.0 / 65.8 × 100 = 12.16%
Renminbi change, 2016–2024
2.2 − 1.1 = 1.1 percentage points
increase
Percentage increase relative to
2016:
1.1 / 1.1 × 100 = 100%
However, the RMB started from a very
small base. Therefore, the 100% relative increase should not be interpreted as
equivalent to the dollar's international position.
Research
interpretation
The statistical evidence
demonstrates currency diversification, but not a direct
dollar-to-renminbi replacement.
The dollar remained at 57.8% of
disclosed official reserves in 2024, compared with 19.8% for the euro
and 2.2% for the renminbi.
Appendix C3 — International Currency Usage
The Federal Reserve's broader
International Currency Usage Index incorporates:
foreign-exchange reserves;
foreign-exchange transactions;
foreign-currency debt issuance;
international banking claims;
international banking liabilities.
For 2024 the index was:
|
Economy/Currency |
International
Currency Usage Index |
GDP
Share |
Trade
Share |
|
United States / USD |
64.9 |
26.1 |
13.4 |
|
Euro area / Euro |
23.9 |
14.9 |
17.4 |
|
China / RMB |
3.1 |
16.8 |
12.8 |
C3.1
Important statistical finding
China's GDP share (16.8%) was
larger than the euro area's (14.9%), yet the RMB's international
currency-usage index (3.1) was far below the euro (23.9) and
dollar (64.9).
This provides quantitative evidence
for the paper's argument that:
Economic size alone does not create
international-currency dominance.
Financial-market depth, liquidity,
institutional confidence, reserve-asset availability and network effects matter
as well. The Federal Reserve specifically identifies the depth and liquidity of
US financial markets and the supply of safe dollar assets as important
foundations of the dollar's international role.
Appendix C4 — International Payment Share
The Federal Reserve's accessible
dataset also reports the currency composition of international payments on
SWIFT.
|
Year |
USD
(%) |
Euro
(%) |
GBP
(%) |
RMB
(%) |
|
2014 |
41.6 |
31.2 |
8.7 |
1.6 |
|
2015 |
44.0 |
28.3 |
8.4 |
2.2 |
|
2016 |
41.8 |
30.8 |
8.1 |
1.9 |
|
2017 |
40.6 |
32.6 |
7.3 |
1.8 |
|
2018 |
39.0 |
34.2 |
7.2 |
1.8 |
|
2019 |
41.3 |
33.1 |
6.8 |
1.9 |
|
2020 |
40.4 |
34.3 |
6.8 |
1.8 |
|
2021 |
39.3 |
37.5 |
6.2 |
2.2 |
|
2022 |
41.2 |
35.7 |
6.5 |
2.3 |
|
2023 |
44.0 |
29.5 |
6.8 |
2.9 |
|
2024 |
47.0 |
22.8 |
7.0 |
4.4 |
Source: Federal Reserve accessible data, based on SWIFT and
Bloomberg.
Statistical
observation
Between 2014 and 2024:
USD international-payment share
47.0 − 41.6 = +5.4 percentage
points
RMB international-payment share
4.4 − 1.6 = +2.8 percentage
points
This indicates that the RMB's
international payment presence has increased, but from a substantially smaller
base.
Appendix C5 — India and Cross-Border Instant Payments
India provides a particularly
important case because UPI is already a large domestic instant-payment
infrastructure.
The BIS reports that Project Nexus
is designed to connect domestic instant-payment systems and potentially allow
cross-border payments to move within approximately 60 seconds in most cases.
India joined the multilateral project alongside Malaysia, the Philippines,
Singapore and Thailand.
The BIS also specifically identifies
India's UPI as one of the systems that can be linked across borders and notes
the existing UPI–PayNow connection with Singapore.
Table
C5.1 — Nexus Analytical Structure
|
Country |
Domestic
payment system |
Role
in Nexus |
|
India |
UPI |
Participating system |
|
Malaysia |
Domestic IPS |
Participating system |
|
Philippines |
Domestic IPS |
Participating system |
|
Singapore |
FAST/PayNow ecosystem |
Participating system |
|
Thailand |
Domestic IPS |
Participating system |
|
Indonesia |
Participating in later Nexus
structure |
Participating system |
The BIS describes Nexus as a
standardized multilateral approach rather than requiring every national payment
system to build a separate bilateral connection with every other country.
Appendix C6 — Statistical Logic of UPI
Internationalisation
The research model can now be
expressed quantitatively:
Independent
variables
Payment interoperability
Digital-payment accessibility
Transaction speed
Transaction-cost reduction
Intermediate
variable
Cross-border payment adoption
Outcome
International payment
diversification
Moderating
variables
FX risk
Liquidity
Regulation
Cybersecurity
Institutional trust
Thus:
Interoperability → Efficiency →
Adoption → Payment Diversification
while:
FX Risk + Liquidity + Regulation +
Cybersecurity
can weaken the relationship.
Appendix C7 — Regression Model for Secondary-Data
Research
Because the available published
currency data are time-series/aggregate data rather than individual
respondents, the regression should not be presented as a respondent-level
behavioural model.
A suitable secondary-data model is:
USD Reserve Shareₜ = α + β₁ Timeₜ +
εₜ
This estimates the direction of the
dollar reserve-share trend.
A second model could examine:
RMB Reserve Shareₜ = α + β₁ Timeₜ +
εₜ
However, the sample is only about
10–25 annual observations depending on the selected period, so statistical
inference must be treated cautiously.
Appendix C8 — CAGR Analysis
For the dollar reserve share:
Initial value = 65.8
Final value = 57.8
Period = 9 years
CAGR:
[(57.8 / 65.8)^(1/9) − 1] × 100
≈ −1.43% per year
For the RMB:
Initial value = 1.1
Final value = 2.2
Period = 8 years
CAGR:
[(2.2 / 1.1)^(1/8) − 1] × 100
≈ 9.05% per year
Interpretation
The RMB shows a much higher growth
rate because it began from a very low base. Therefore, CAGR should be read
alongside absolute percentage-point changes.
Appendix C9 — Comparative Payment Architecture
|
Indicator |
Dollar |
RMB |
UPI |
|
Currency |
USD |
RMB |
INR-linked payment rail |
|
Sovereign currency |
Yes |
Yes |
No |
|
Reserve-currency role |
Major |
Limited |
No |
|
Payment infrastructure |
Extensive |
Extensive |
Extensive domestically |
|
Cross-border function |
Extensive |
Expanding |
Expanding |
|
Main strength |
Liquidity/network |
Chinese trade/financial
infrastructure |
Instant digital payments |
|
Main limitation |
Dependence/network concentration |
Lower global currency usage |
Not itself a currency |
This table reinforces one of the
central conceptual findings of the case:
USD/RMB = currencies
UPI = payment infrastructure
The distinction is essential to
avoid treating a payment platform as a replacement currency.
Appendix C10 — Empirical Hypothesis Matrix
|
Hypothesis |
Variable
1 |
Variable
2 |
Method |
|
H1 |
Interoperability |
Transaction efficiency |
Correlation/Regression |
|
H2 |
Local-currency settlement |
Dollar-conversion dependence |
Correlation/Regression |
|
H3 |
UPI usability |
Adoption intention |
Regression |
|
H4 |
Institutional trust |
Adoption intention |
Regression |
|
H5 |
FX risk |
Adoption intention |
Regression |
|
H6 |
Cybersecurity concern |
Adoption intention |
Regression |
|
H7 |
Payment diversification |
Strategic flexibility |
Regression |
Appendix C11 — Hypothesis Decision Format
For the final empirical paper, use
this format:
|
Hypothesis |
Statistical
value |
p-value |
Decision |
|
H1 |
Actual result |
Actual result |
Accepted/Rejected |
|
H2 |
Actual result |
Actual result |
Accepted/Rejected |
|
H3 |
Actual result |
Actual result |
Accepted/Rejected |
|
H4 |
Actual result |
Actual result |
Accepted/Rejected |
|
H5 |
Actual result |
Actual result |
Accepted/Rejected |
|
H6 |
Actual result |
Actual result |
Accepted/Rejected |
|
H7 |
Actual result |
Actual result |
Accepted/Rejected |
These cells should only be populated
after actual observations are analysed.
Appendix C12 — New Empirical Finding
The combined secondary evidence
creates a particularly useful research finding:
Finding:
Payment diversification is occurring at two different levels.
Level 1 — Currency diversification
The dollar's share of official
reserves has declined over the long term, while other currencies have gained
some share.
Level 2 — Payment-infrastructure
diversification
Countries are developing and
connecting instant-payment systems, with Project Nexus explicitly designed to
connect domestic systems internationally.
Therefore:
The international monetary system is
experiencing both currency diversification and payment-infrastructure
diversification, but the two processes are not identical.
This is a strong central finding for
your research paper.
Appendix C13 — Revised Research Model
INDIA'S
DIGITAL-MULTI-CURRENCY PAYMENT MODEL
US Dollar
↓
Global finance + reserves + trade + banking
Rupee
↓
Indian trade + local-currency settlement
UPI
↓
Digital payment infrastructure
BRICS / Regional Payment
Connectivity
↓
Cross-border interoperability
Indian Economic Actors
→ Exporters
→ Importers
→ MSMEs
→ Tourists
→ Students
→ Remittance users
→ Fintech companies
Moderators
Liquidity | FX Risk | Trust |
Cybersecurity | Regulation | Geopolitics
Appendix
C14 — Final Statistical Interpretation
The actual secondary data do not
support a simple conclusion that the dollar is being replaced.
They show three measurable
developments:
The dollar's reserve share has declined from its historical
peak.
The RMB and other currencies have gained some international
presence.
Cross-border payment infrastructure is becoming more
interconnected, including India's UPI.
At the same time, the dollar
remained at about 58% of disclosed official reserves in 2024, and the
Federal Reserve describes it as still the dominant reserve currency.
The BIS's Project Nexus provides
concrete evidence that the payment-rail side of the international system
is changing, with the objective of improving speed, cost, transparency and
access in cross-border payments.