Arms Supply to the Middle East and Europe
Under a 2027–2030 Shortage Scenario: A Strategic and Economic Assessment of the
United States, Russia, China, and India
A Case-cum-Research Paper on Global Defence
Trade, Industrial Capacity, Geopolitical Competition, and India's Export
Potential
Abstract
The global arms trade is undergoing structural transformation due to
geopolitical conflicts, military modernization, supply-chain constraints,
technological competition, and rising defence expenditure. The possibility of a
defence-product shortage during 2027–2030 raises an important strategic and
economic question: which countries will be capable of supplying Europe and the
Middle East if existing procurement systems experience production bottlenecks
and delivery delays?
This paper examines the prospective roles of the United States, Russia,
China, and India in a hypothetical global defence supply shortage. It evaluates
their export capacity, production scale, technological capabilities,
geopolitical influence, product diversification, and institutional support
mechanisms. Particular attention is given to India's growing defence exports
and the limitations that may prevent the country from becoming a dominant
supplier to Europe and the Middle East by 2030.
The study adopts a comparative, scenario-based research methodology using
secondary data, international arms-transfer statistics, defence export
information, and strategic assessments. It distinguishes between actual
arms-transfer trends and hypothetical future shortage scenarios. A quantitative
supplier-capacity framework is developed to evaluate the relative strengths and
weaknesses of the four countries. The analysis suggests that the United States
is likely to retain its position in high-end defence systems, while European
countries and South Korea may absorb a substantial share of incremental demand.
China may expand in selected categories, particularly unmanned systems, whereas
India is likely to emerge as a cost-competitive niche supplier rather than a
dominant regional supplier by 2030.
The paper concludes with policy recommendations for India concerning
production scaling, export financing, technology development, international
partnerships, lifecycle maintenance, and strategic market diversification.
Keywords: Defence exports, arms trade, India, United
States, Russia, China, Europe, Middle East, supply shortage, geopolitical
economy, 2027–2030.
1.1 Background of the Study
The international defence industry represents a complex intersection of
economic production, national security, technological innovation, international
relations, and foreign trade. Arms exports are not determined solely by product
prices; they also depend on production capacity, political alliances,
technology transfer, export controls, financing, maintenance infrastructure,
and buyer confidence.
The period 2021–2025 witnessed a significant shift in international arms
transfers. According to the Stockholm International Peace Research Institute
(SIPRI), the global volume of major arms transfers increased by 9.2% compared
with 2016–2020. The United States accounted for 42% of global major arms
exports, while Russia's share declined to 6.8%. Europe became the largest
regional destination for major arms imports, accounting for 33% of the global total,
followed by Asia and Oceania at 31% and the Middle East at 26%. (SIPRI, 2026).
The changing pattern creates a strategic opportunity for emerging defence
exporters. India, in particular, has expanded its defence manufacturing and
export capabilities. Nevertheless, export growth does not automatically
translate into global leadership. A country must demonstrate reliable
production, technological sophistication, delivery commitments, export
financing, and long-term customer support.
1.2 Statement of the Research Problem
The central research problem is whether the United States, Russia, China, or
India will be capable of meeting the additional defence-product demand arising
from a hypothetical shortage during 2027–2030.
A shortage may arise from:
·
Simultaneous military procurement by Europe, the
Middle East, and Asia.
·
Production bottlenecks in advanced weapons
manufacturing.
·
Limited availability of critical components and
materials.
·
Increased demand for air defence, ammunition,
radar, drones, and artillery.
·
Delayed deliveries caused by geopolitical
priorities.
·
Reduced export capacity due to domestic military
requirements.
India's rising defence exports provide an opportunity, but its ability to
replace established suppliers remains uncertain.
1.3 Research Questions
1. Which
country is most likely to retain leadership in global arms supply during
2027–2030?
2. How
will the United States manage competing defence demands from Europe and the
Middle East?
3. Can
Russia recover its arms-export position despite declining exports and
geopolitical constraints?
4. Can
China expand its defence exports to fill selected market gaps?
5. Can
India become a major defence supplier to Europe and the Middle East by 2030?
6. Which
product categories offer India the strongest export opportunities?
7. What
industrial, financial, technological, and institutional reforms are required
for India to strengthen its position?
1.4 Objectives of the Study
The objectives are:
·
To examine the international arms-transfer
structure during 2021–2025.
·
To analyse the export performance of the United
States, Russia, China, and India.
·
To assess the supply-demand imbalance under a
hypothetical 2027–2030 shortage scenario.
·
To compare supplier capabilities using a
structured analytical framework.
·
To identify the opportunities and limitations of
Indian defence exports.
·
To formulate strategic recommendations for
India's defence manufacturing and export policy.
1.5 Research Hypotheses
H1: The United States will continue to dominate the
high-end global arms market during 2027–2030.
H2: European countries and South Korea will benefit
substantially from defence procurement diversification.
H3: China will expand its role in selected defence-product
categories, particularly cost-sensitive and unmanned systems.
H4: India will experience export growth but will not become
the dominant arms supplier to Europe and the Middle East by 2030.
H5: Production capacity, product diversification,
financing, and lifecycle support are more important determinants of export
leadership than export growth alone.
These hypotheses are assessed through secondary-data analysis and
scenario-based reasoning. They are not presented as statistically proven causal
relationships.
2.1 Research Design
The study follows a descriptive, comparative, exploratory, and scenario-based
research design.
It combines:
·
Secondary-data analysis.
·
Comparative international trade assessment.
·
Strategic industry analysis.
·
Supplier capability assessment.
·
Hypothetical shortage scenario analysis.
·
Policy evaluation.
2.2 Sources of Data
The principal sources are:
1. Stockholm
International Peace Research Institute (SIPRI), Trends in International Arms
Transfers, 2025.
2. Government
of India, Ministry of Defence, defence export statistics.
3. Press
Information Bureau (PIB), Government of India.
4. Defence
manufacturing and export policy documents.
5. Published
assessments of international defence industries.
2.3 Period of Study
The historical baseline is 2021–2025.
The prospective analytical period is 2027–2030.
The year 2026 is treated as the transition period for examining updated
export data and industrial developments.
2.4 Scope of the Study
The geographical scope includes:
·
Europe.
·
The Middle East.
The supplier scope includes:
·
United States.
·
Russia.
·
China.
·
India.
France, Germany, Italy, South Korea, and other suppliers are included as
comparative competitors.
2.5 Data Analysis Techniques
The following methods are used:
A. Percentage change analysis
Percentage change = [(Current period value − Previous period value) /
Previous period value] × 100.
B. Market-share analysis
Market share = (Supplier's arms-transfer volume / Total global arms-transfer
volume) × 100.
C. Comparative supplier analysis
Supplier capabilities are evaluated across production scale, product range,
technological capacity, export financing, political influence, and after-sales
support.
D. Scenario analysis
Three hypothetical scenarios are constructed:
·
Moderate shortage.
·
Severe shortage.
·
Prolonged geopolitical shortage.
E. Strategic SWOT analysis
Strengths, weaknesses, opportunities, and threats are evaluated for India.
2.6 Data Limitations
SIPRI's Trend-Indicator Values (TIVs) measure the volume of international
transfers of major arms. They are not equivalent to monetary export revenues,
contract prices, or market capitalization.
Indian defence export figures are reported in Indian rupees and generally
refer to financial-year totals. SIPRI's arms-transfer data are based on
calendar-year periods and cover major arms transfers under its methodology.
These datasets are therefore not directly interchangeable.
The 2027–2030 shortage is a hypothetical scenario, not an established future
event. All forward-looking assessments are conditional.
3.
Quantitative data analysis: Global arms trade
The following statistics are drawn
from SIPRI's March 2026 report covering actual major-arms transfers in
2021–2025.
SIPRI+1
Table
1. Comparative global arms-export market share
|
Country |
2016–20
share |
2021–25
share |
Change
in transfer volume |
|
United States |
36% |
42% |
+27% |
|
France |
8.8% |
9.8% |
+21% |
|
Russia |
21% |
6.8% |
−64% |
|
Germany |
5.4% |
5.7% |
+15% |
|
China |
5.5% |
5.6% |
+11% |
|
Italy |
2.2% |
5.1% |
+157% |
|
South Korea |
2.6% |
3.0% |
+24% |
Global Arms Export Share, 2021–2025
Market shares in SIPRI's major arms
transfer volume.
0%15%30%45%USAFranceRussiaGermanyChinaItalySouth
Korea
Source: SIPRI, March 2026.
Interpretation
of Table 1
- The United States retained a commanding position with
42% of the global arms-export volume.
- France strengthened its position as the second-largest
exporter.
- Russia's transfer volume declined sharply by 64%, demonstrating
substantial structural challenges.
- China's market share remained relatively stable, with
modest growth.
- Italy and South Korea exhibited important growth,
making them relevant competitors in the shortage scenario.
The data indicate that the global defence
market is not simply a contest between four countries. European suppliers and
South Korea are also important competitors.
Table
2. Regional arms-import structure, 2021–2025
|
Region |
Share
of global imports |
|
Europe |
33% |
|
Asia and Oceania |
31% |
|
Middle East |
26% |
|
Americas |
5.6% |
|
Africa |
4.3% |
Regional Share of Global Major Arms
Imports
Percentage distribution in
2021–2025.
Africa
Americas
Asia and Oceania
Europe
Middle East
Source: SIPRI, March 2026.
Interpretation
of Table 2
Europe and the Middle East together
accounted for 59% of global major-arms imports in 2021–2025.
This indicates the strategic
importance of these two markets. However, their procurement patterns differ:
- Europe is strongly influenced by NATO interoperability,
collective security, and the Ukraine conflict.
- The Middle East is influenced by regional security
competition, air defence requirements, modernization, and strategic
partnerships.
Therefore, a supplier must develop
different market strategies for the two regions.
Table
3. United States supplier concentration
|
Recipient |
Share
of US arms exports |
|
Saudi Arabia |
12% |
|
Ukraine |
9.4% |
|
Japan |
8.9% |
Source: SIPRI, 2021–2025.
fs_2603_at_2025.pdf
The United States has a
geographically diversified export base. Its extensive military relationships,
technical compatibility, and support networks make it difficult for other
suppliers to replace it rapidly.
Table
4. India's defence export performance
Source: Ministry of Defence,
Government of India, 2 April 2026.
Press Information Bureau
|
Financial
year |
Defence
exports |
|
FY 2024–25 |
₹23,622 crore |
|
FY 2025–26 |
₹38,424 crore |
|
Absolute increase |
₹14,802 crore |
|
Percentage increase |
62.66% |
India's Defence Exports
Reported annual export values in ₹
crore.
0 crore15K crore30K crore45K croreFY
2024–25FY 2025–26
Source: Ministry of Defence, India.
Calculation
1. Percentage growth
\[
\text{Growth}=\frac{38,424-23,622}{23,622}\times100 \]
\[ =\frac{14,802}{23,622}\times100
\]
\[ =\boxed{62.66\%} \]
Calculation
2. Export composition
The Ministry of Defence reported the
following contribution in FY 2025–26:
|
Exporter
category |
Share |
Export
value |
|
Defence Public Sector Undertakings
(DPSUs) |
54.84% |
₹21,071 crore |
|
Private sector |
45.16% |
₹17,353 crore |
|
Total |
100% |
₹38,424 crore |
India Defence Export Composition, FY
2025–26
Contribution by exporter category.
DPSUs
Private sector
Source: Ministry of Defence, India.
Data
interpretation
India's export performance reflects
a substantial expansion of its defence manufacturing ecosystem. The
contribution of both public and private enterprises indicates that export
capability is not confined to government-owned manufacturers.
However, export growth is not
equivalent to global supplier leadership.
A country may achieve high
percentage growth from a comparatively small base, while established exporters
retain substantially greater international transfer volumes, product
portfolios, and customer networks.
India's ₹38,424 crore export figure
is a financial measure, while SIPRI's international market shares are based on
TIV. These measures must not be combined into one ranking.
SIPRI+1
4.
Comparative supplier analysis
4.1 United States: Dominant Global Supplier
The United States possesses the strongest combination of high-end
technology, industrial capacity, export financing, international alliances, and
lifecycle support.
Its competitive advantages include:
·
Advanced combat aircraft.
·
Missile and air-defence systems.
·
Precision-guided munitions.
·
Naval systems.
·
Intelligence, surveillance, and command systems.
·
Extensive training and maintenance networks.
The United States faces a potential challenge when simultaneous procurement
requirements exceed production capacity. In such circumstances, delivery
prioritization may become more important than supplier market share.
The likely role of the United States during 2027–2030 is continued high-end
supplier leadership, accompanied by possible delivery delays in selected product
categories.
4.2 Russia: Declining Export Position
Russia remains an established defence manufacturer with experience in combat
aircraft, missiles, tanks, artillery, and air-defence equipment.
Nevertheless, the decline in its international transfer volume creates
significant constraints.
The major challenges include:
·
Domestic military production requirements.
·
Sanctions and component-access difficulties.
·
Reduced export confidence among certain buyers.
·
Delivery and financing uncertainty.
·
Competition from alternative suppliers.
Russia may continue serving selected legacy customers, but its ability to
compensate for a large global shortage remains uncertain.
4.3 China: Expanding Selective Supplier
China possesses substantial manufacturing capacity and has developed a
growing export portfolio.
Its prospective opportunities include:
·
Unmanned aerial systems.
·
Selected missile systems.
·
Naval equipment.
·
Training aircraft.
·
Cost-sensitive defence products.
China's constraints include geopolitical concerns, interoperability
challenges, buyer confidence, and political relationships with Western-aligned
countries.
Its role is likely to be selective expansion rather than replacement of the
entire US defence supply system.
4.4 India: Emerging Cost-Competitive
Supplier
India's defence industry has expanded through domestic manufacturing,
private-sector participation, technology development, and export promotion.
Its potential export categories include:
·
Artillery systems.
·
Radars.
·
Selected air-defence systems.
·
Naval platforms.
·
Missiles and rocket systems.
·
Components and subsystems.
India's challenges include production scalability, international
certification, export financing, delivery assurance, and global maintenance
infrastructure.
The country is therefore better positioned to become a mid-tier or niche
supplier by 2030 than to become the dominant supplier to Europe and the Middle
East.
4.5 European Countries and South Korea
France, Germany, Italy, and South Korea are important competitors in the
international defence market.
South Korea has gained a notable position in selected artillery,
armoured-vehicle, and aircraft categories. European suppliers benefit from
established industrial capacity and regional defence procurement networks.
Under a shortage scenario, these suppliers may capture incremental demand
that cannot be fulfilled by the United States.
5.
Scenario-based analysis: 2027–2030
The following scenarios are
analytical assumptions, not forecasts based on an established probability
model.
Scenario A
Moderate shortage
Assumption: Production delays in
selected defence categories, but no major global escalation.
- United States: Retains leadership.
- Europe and South Korea: Capture additional orders.
- China: Expands in selected product categories.
- India: Gains niche export contracts.
- Russia: Remains constrained.
Scenario B
Severe
shortage
Assumption: Simultaneous high demand
in Europe and the Middle East, accompanied by production bottlenecks.
- United States: Prioritizes strategic commitments.
- France, Germany, Italy, and South Korea: Become major
alternative suppliers.
- China: Gains selected supplementary markets.
- India: Benefits from demand for cost-competitive
systems, provided delivery capacity is available.
- Russia: Faces difficulties in filling the supply gap.
Scenario C
Prolonged
geopolitical shortage
Assumption: Multiple conflicts,
sustained procurement pressure, and major supply-chain disruption.
- US leadership continues, but supply allocation becomes
more restrictive.
- European domestic production becomes increasingly important.
- South Korea benefits from its export manufacturing
capacity.
- China expands among politically receptive buyers.
- India has an opportunity to expand, but industrial
scalability becomes the decisive constraint.
Table
5. Scenario-based supplier positioning
|
Supplier |
Moderate
shortage |
Severe
shortage |
Prolonged
shortage |
|
USA |
Very strong |
Very strong, capacity constrained |
Strong, but prioritization
required |
|
Russia |
Weak |
Weak |
Uncertain |
|
China |
Moderate |
Moderate to strong in selected
categories |
Stronger selective position |
|
India |
Emerging |
Emerging, scale constrained |
Potential growth, conditional |
|
Europe |
Strong |
Very strong |
Very strong |
|
South Korea |
Strong |
Very strong |
Strong |
Qualitative assessment based on the
paper's comparative analysis. This is not an observed statistical ranking or
probability estimate.
6.
Supplier capability assessment
To strengthen the quantitative
aspect of the paper, a weighted supplier-capability model can be used.
Table
6. Proposed weighted assessment framework
|
Evaluation
criterion |
Weight |
|
Production scale and delivery
capacity |
25% |
|
Product range and technological
capability |
20% |
|
Export financing and institutional
support |
15% |
|
International customer base |
15% |
|
Maintenance and lifecycle support |
15% |
|
Price competitiveness |
10% |
|
Total |
100% |
Scoring system:
- 1 = Very low capability
- 2 = Low capability
- 3 = Moderate capability
- 4 = High capability
- 5 = Very high capability
Weighted score formula:
\[ \text{Supplier
Score}=\sum_{i=1}^{6}W_iS_i \]
Where:
- \(W_i\) = weight assigned to criterion.
- \(S_i\) = supplier's score on the criterion.
The weights are proposed by the
researcher and require validation by defence-industry experts. Actual supplier
scores should be assigned using documented evidence or an expert survey.
Important research improvement: I
recommend not assigning invented scores to the four countries and calling them
empirical results. A proper scorecard should be completed using validated
information from industry experts, procurement data, and official sources.
7.
SWOT analysis of India's defence export industry
7.1 Strengths
1. Expanding
domestic defence manufacturing.
2. Competitive
pricing in selected equipment categories.
3. Increasing
public and private sector participation.
4. Growing
international defence partnerships.
5. Diverse
manufacturing capabilities.
6. Government
support for export promotion.
7.2 Weaknesses
1. Limited
scale in some high-end export categories.
2. Inadequate
international maintenance networks.
3. Limited
export financing compared with established suppliers.
4. Delivery
and production scalability challenges.
5. Uneven
international customer familiarity.
6. Dependence
on certain imported components and technologies.
7.3 Opportunities
1. Defence
procurement diversification.
2. Growing
demand for selected artillery and air-defence products.
3. Joint
ventures and licensed manufacturing.
4. Regional
partnerships with friendly countries.
5. Expansion
of maintenance, repair, and overhaul services.
6. Export
of components and subsystems.
7. Technology
collaboration with European and Asian manufacturers.
7.4 Threats
1. Competition
from the United States, France, China, Russia, and South Korea.
2. Export
restrictions and geopolitical tensions.
3. Changes
in foreign procurement policy.
4. International
technology and certification requirements.
5. Production
delays and contractual risks.
6. Reputational
risks associated with arms transfers.
Finding 1: The United States retains global
leadership
The 42% share of global major-arms exports during 2021–2025 establishes a
substantial competitive advantage. No evidence in the baseline data indicates
that India can replace this position by 2030.
Finding 2: Europe is a critical defence
procurement market
Europe accounted for 33% of global major-arms imports during 2021–2025. This
creates opportunities for suppliers capable of meeting European procurement,
interoperability, and certification requirements.
Finding 3: Russia's export position has
weakened
The 64% decline in Russian arms-transfer volume between 2016–2020 and
2021–2025 indicates a major reduction in its international position.
Finding 4: China has a selective expansion
opportunity
China's relatively stable 5.6% global export share indicates an established
international position. Its ability to expand during a shortage depends on
product category, political acceptance, and customer requirements.
Finding 5: India demonstrates strong export
growth
India's defence exports increased to ₹38,424 crore in FY 2025–2026,
representing 62.66% growth over the previous financial year.
Finding 6: Export growth and export
leadership are different
India's export growth is impressive, but leadership requires sustained
delivery capacity, a broad export portfolio, international customer support,
financing, and long-term procurement relationships.
Finding 7: Europe and South Korea are
important omitted competitors
An analysis limited to the United States, Russia, China, and India would be
incomplete. France, Germany, Italy, and South Korea are significant suppliers
capable of absorbing additional demand.
Finding 8: India has a strategic
opportunity, but it is conditional
India's future export position depends on industrial scale, production
reliability, technological development, international partnerships, and
institutional export support.
9.1 Production Capacity Enhancement
India should prioritize expansion of production capacity in exportable
defence categories.
Suggested measures:
·
Increase manufacturing capacity for established
export products.
·
Improve component availability.
·
Develop supplier clusters.
·
Reduce production bottlenecks.
·
Establish realistic export delivery schedules.
·
Encourage private manufacturers to participate
in long-term production contracts.
9.2 Export Product Diversification
India should reduce excessive concentration in selected products and develop
a broader portfolio.
Priority areas for further assessment include:
·
Radar and surveillance systems.
·
Artillery and rocket systems.
·
Naval equipment.
·
Aircraft components.
·
Selected air-defence systems.
·
Communication and electronic subsystems.
·
Maintenance and repair services.
The suitability of each product for European or Middle Eastern export
markets must be assessed separately.
9.3 Export Financing
India should develop stronger government-supported export financing
mechanisms.
Possible measures include:
·
Defence export credit facilities.
·
Buyer financing subject to government approval.
·
Export insurance.
·
Long-term payment arrangements.
·
Support for joint manufacturing projects.
Financing can improve the competitiveness of Indian products when buyers
compare suppliers offering similar capabilities.
9.4 International Maintenance Infrastructure
Export leadership depends not only on initial equipment delivery but also on
lifecycle support.
India should establish regional service centres, technical training
programmes, spare-parts networks, and maintenance partnerships where commercially
and legally appropriate.
9.5 Research and Development
Investment should be directed toward exportable technologies with
demonstrable performance and reliability.
Public-private partnerships, academic research, and industry collaboration
can support product innovation.
9.6 European Market Strategy
India should not treat Europe as a uniform market.
A market-entry strategy should consider:
·
Procurement regulations.
·
NATO interoperability requirements.
·
Product certification.
·
Local manufacturing partnerships.
·
Political and security relationships.
·
Lifecycle maintenance commitments.
India may initially find greater opportunities in components, subsystems,
and collaborative production than in replacing established high-end platforms.
9.7 Middle Eastern Market Strategy
The Middle East may offer selected opportunities in radar, naval equipment,
surveillance, and other cost-competitive systems.
However, India should evaluate each country's procurement policies, end-user
requirements, financing capacity, export-control obligations, and geopolitical
implications.
9.8 Export Governance
Defence export expansion should be accompanied by strict compliance with:
·
National export-control legislation.
·
End-user verification.
·
International obligations.
·
Human-rights and conflict-risk assessments.
·
Anti-diversion measures.
·
Contractual accountability.
9.9 Performance Monitoring
India should develop an annual defence-export performance dashboard
covering:
1. Export
value.
2. Number
of destination countries.
3. Export
order backlog.
4. Delivery
performance.
5. Product
diversification.
6. Private-sector
contribution.
7. Research
and development expenditure.
8. Export
financing.
9. Lifecycle
support coverage.
10. Customer
satisfaction and repeat contracts.
Conclusion
The international defence market during 2027–2030 is likely to remain
characterized by competition, strategic partnerships, production constraints,
and selective procurement diversification.
The United States is expected to retain its leadership in high-end defence
systems due to its technological capabilities, established customer networks,
industrial scale, and strategic alliances. Russia's declining international
arms-transfer volume limits its ability to act as a major alternative supplier.
China may expand in selected product categories, particularly where buyers
prioritize affordability and diversification.
India's defence export performance demonstrates an important transformation
in domestic manufacturing. The increase to ₹38,424 crore in FY 2025–2026
represents a significant achievement. Nevertheless, becoming the dominant arms
supplier to Europe and the Middle East by 2030 would require a substantial
expansion in industrial capacity, product range, financing, technological
capability, and international support infrastructure.
The analysis indicates that the most probable outcome under the shortage
scenario is a layered international supply structure rather than the emergence
of one replacement leader.
The United States would remain the principal high-end supplier. European
manufacturers and South Korea could absorb additional demand. China would
expand selectively, while India would compete in niche and cost-sensitive
categories.
For India, the strategic objective should therefore be to become a reliable,
technologically competitive, and internationally trusted defence exporter. This
would be a more realistic and economically sustainable ambition than attempting
to replace the United States in the global defence market by 2030.
The study concludes that India's opportunity lies not merely in increasing
export value but in strengthening production reliability, technology,
financing, international partnerships, and long-term customer relationships.
Global defence supply leadership is a multidimensional industrial and strategic
capability, not simply a measure of annual export growth.
References (APA-style)
Government of India, Ministry of Defence. (2026, April 2). Defence
exports skyrocket to record Rs 38,424 crore in financial year 2025–26, a
massive 62.66% increase over previous fiscal. Press Information Bureau.
https://www.pib.gov.in/PressReleasePage.aspx?PRID=2248124
Government of India, Ministry of Defence. (2026). The defence decade:
Enhanced capability, greater capacity, and stronger credibility. Press
Information Bureau.
Stockholm International Peace Research Institute. (2026). Trends in
international arms transfers, 2025. SIPRI.
https://www.sipri.org/publications/2026/sipri-fact-sheets/trends-international-arms-transfers-2025
Stockholm International Peace Research Institute. (n.d.). Sources and
methods: SIPRI Arms Transfers Database.
https://www.sipri.org/databases/armstransfers/sources-and-methods
Stockholm International Peace Research Institute. (n.d.). SIPRI Arms
Transfers Database.
https://armstransfers.sipri.org/
Stockholm International Peace Research Institute. (n.d.). Financial
value of the global arms trade.
https://www.sipri.org/databases/financial-value-global-arms-trade
World Bank. (n.d.). World Development Indicators: Arms imports (SIPRI
trend-indicator values).
https://databank.worldbank.org/
Appendix
A: Key statistical data
|
Variable |
Historical
value |
Source |
|
Global arms-transfer volume growth |
+9.2% |
SIPRI 2026 |
|
US export share |
42% |
SIPRI 2026 |
|
Russian export-share decline |
21% to 6.8% |
SIPRI 2026 |
|
European import share |
33% |
SIPRI 2026 |
|
Middle Eastern import share |
26% |
SIPRI 2026 |
|
Indian defence exports FY2024–25 |
₹23,622 crore |
Ministry of Defence |
|
Indian defence exports FY2025–26 |
₹38,424 crore |
Ministry of Defence |
|
Indian export growth |
62.66% |
Ministry of Defence |
Appendix
B: Proposed expert survey
The following questionnaire may be
administered to defence-industry experts, researchers, procurement
professionals, and manufacturing executives.
- Which supplier is most likely to retain global
arms-export leadership by 2030?
- Which region is likely to face the greatest procurement
pressure under a shortage?
- Can India meet large-scale European defence procurement
requirements by 2030?
- Which Indian defence products possess the strongest
export potential?
- How important is production capacity relative to
product price?
- How important is export financing in international
procurement decisions?
- Does lifecycle maintenance influence defence buyer
selection?
- Can India expand its role in the Middle East?
- What are the principal barriers to Indian defence
exports?
- Which policy reforms should receive the highest
priority?
Proposed sample: 50–100 experts, subject to availability and feasibility.
The questionnaire data may be
analysed using frequency distribution, mean scores, standard deviation,
Cronbach's alpha for appropriate multi-item scales, and inferential tests where
sample size and assumptions permit.
Appendix
C: Future empirical analysis
To strengthen the paper for journal
submission, the researcher may obtain country-wise and product-wise SIPRI
transfer data for 2016–2025 and develop:
- Export concentration indices.
- Five-year growth comparisons.
- Destination-market diversification measures.
- Supplier rankings by region.
- Product-category comparisons.
- Expert-survey-based capability scores.
- Regression analysis, subject to sufficient valid
observations.
Any future regression or statistical
model must use actual observations. Simulated observations must be identified
separately and must not be presented as empirical findings.
Appendix
A: Key statistical data
|
Variable |
Historical
value |
Source |
|
Global arms-transfer volume growth |
+9.2% |
SIPRI 2026 |
|
US export share |
42% |
SIPRI 2026 |
|
Russian export-share decline |
21% to 6.8% |
SIPRI 2026 |
|
European import share |
33% |
SIPRI 2026 |
|
Middle Eastern import share |
26% |
SIPRI 2026 |
|
Indian defence exports FY2024–25 |
₹23,622 crore |
Ministry of Defence |
|
Indian defence exports FY2025–26 |
₹38,424 crore |
Ministry of Defence |
|
Indian export growth |
62.66% |
Ministry of Defence |
Appendix
B: Proposed expert survey
The following questionnaire may be
administered to defence-industry experts, researchers, procurement
professionals, and manufacturing executives.
- Which supplier is most likely to retain global
arms-export leadership by 2030?
- Which region is likely to face the greatest procurement
pressure under a shortage?
- Can India meet large-scale European defence procurement
requirements by 2030?
- Which Indian defence products possess the strongest
export potential?
- How important is production capacity relative to
product price?
- How important is export financing in international
procurement decisions?
- Does lifecycle maintenance influence defence buyer
selection?
- Can India expand its role in the Middle East?
- What are the principal barriers to Indian defence
exports?
- Which policy reforms should receive the highest
priority?
Proposed sample: 50–100 experts, subject to availability and feasibility.
The questionnaire data may be
analysed using frequency distribution, mean scores, standard deviation,
Cronbach's alpha for appropriate multi-item scales, and inferential tests where
sample size and assumptions permit.
Appendix
C: Future empirical analysis
To strengthen the paper for journal
submission, the researcher may obtain country-wise and product-wise SIPRI
transfer data for 2016–2025 and develop:
- Export concentration indices.
- Five-year growth comparisons.
- Destination-market diversification measures.
- Supplier rankings by region.
- Product-category comparisons.
- Expert-survey-based capability scores.
- Regression analysis, subject to sufficient valid
observations.
Any future regression or statistical
model must use actual observations. Simulated observations must be identified
separately and must not be presented as empirical findings.
