The South China Sea in 2025: Power, Trade, and Tensions in Asia’s Most Contested Waters

The South China Sea in 2025: Power, Trade, and Tensions in Asia’s Most Contested Waters

Introduction

The South China Sea (SCS) remains one of the world’s most consequential maritime regions — for trade, resources, and strategic power projection. Roughly one-third of global maritime trade transits through it, including large proportions of oil, liquefied petroleum gas (LPG), and container traffic At the same time, rich fisheries and undersea oil/gas potential add stakes to overlapping territorial claims.

China’s expansive claims — largely anchored in its “nine-dash line” map — overlap with those of Vietnam, the Philippines, Malaysia, Brunei, and Taiwan. In recent decades, China has pressed its claims through island construction, maritime militia deployment, and coercive maritime and coast guard actions. The tensions have escalated, particularly with the Philippines, sparking diplomatic, legal, and military countermeasures.

This article traces the historical evolution of the dispute, reviews recent incidents (2023–2025), assesses strategic stakes (trade, energy, fisheries), and explores possible future scenarios and policy prescriptions.

 

Historical Background and Legal Framework

Early Claims and Partition of Claims (mid-20th century onward)

• China’s claim over most of the South China Sea via historic maps dates from the mid-20th century (e.g. maps in 1947 with dashes) and subsequent assertions of sovereignty. Meanwhile, from the 1950s through the 1970s, nations around the South China Sea — Vietnam (North and then unified), the Philippines, Malaysia, Taiwan (Republic of China), and Brunei — advanced claims to islands, reefs, and maritime zones based on proximity, effective occupation, or historic usage
• The competing claims centered mostly on the Spratly Islands, Paracel Islands, Scarborough Shoal, and submerged features

The Legal Framework: UNCLOS, EEZs, and International Arbitration

• The United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS, 1982) provides for territorial seas (12 nautical miles), exclusive economic zones (EEZs, 200 nautical miles), continental shelves, and regimes for high seas.
• Under UNCLOS, coastal states have sovereign rights for resource exploration and exploitation in their EEZs, but freedom of navigation remains for all states.
• In 2016, following a case initiated by the Philippines, the Permanent Court of Arbitration in The Hague issued a ruling that invalidated broad Chinese claims under the nine-dash line, declared that China had no legal basis to claim historic rights inside that line insofar as they exceed what UNCLOS grants, and affirmed the Philippines’ rights in its EEZ. However, China rejected the ruling and declared it non-binding, continuing to treat much of the sea as under its sovereignty.

Strategic Stakes: Trade, Resources, and Ecology

Trade and Maritime Flows

• The South China Sea is a vital global trade route: approximately one-third of global maritime trade passes through it. Some estimates put value of trade transiting it at over USD 3 trillion annually. A large share of China’s energy imports and total trade uses SCS routes — estimates suggest 80% of China’s energy imports and 40% of its total trade pass through these waters
• Disruption in these sea lanes due to conflict or coercive blockades would have ripple effects on global supply chains, energy markets, and the shipping industry.

Energy and Hydrocarbons

• Undersea, the SCS is believed to contain substantial hydrocarbon reserves. One commonly cited figure is about 11 billion barrels of undiscovered oil and 190 trillion cubic feet (tcf) of natural gas. Piecemeal attribution of these resources is contested among China, Malaysia, Vietnam, and the Philippines. China, Malaysia, and Vietnam are among the leading claimants in terms of proved or probable reserves. Exploitation is complicated by overlapping claims and security risks. Some areas are off-limits to non-Chinese companies due to Chinese control, or risk interference.

Fisheries and Environmental Risk

• The South China Sea is ecologically rich: coral reefs and marine biodiversity are substantial. It is often estimated that 22% of the world’s known fish species inhabit SCS reefs. Overfishing, habitat destruction (from reclamation and dredging), and militarized fishing fleets have caused dramatic declines in fish stocks. Some analyses suggest fish stocks are down 70–95% since the 1950s.
• Coral reef coverage is declining at about 16% per decade, further undermining ecological resilience. The militarization of fishing fleets (i.e. vessels subsidized and deployed for territorial control) is a new trend, turning fishermen into quasi-military actors.

Recent Developments (2023–2025)

Over the last few years, tensions have escalated in intensity, frequency, and complexity. Below is a thematic survey of notable incidents and trends.

Escalation Patterns and Incident Trends

• According to one study, maritime incidents between China and the Philippines increased sharply beginning in Q3 2023.
• China Coast Guard (CCG) vessels have collided with or ramed Philippine resupply or coast guard vessels. In 2024 alone, two collisions caused injuries and vessel damage.
• One particularly high-profile event occurred on 17 June 2024, when Philippines tried to resupply its personnel at Second Thomas Shoal. China Coast Guard escalated by boarding, using axes/knives, slashing rafts, using water cannons, and reportedly injuring Filipino personnel (one lost his thumb).
• The June 2024 incident is considered one of the most aggressive in recent memory.
• In 2024, Chinese fighter jets also conducted “dangerous aerial maneuvers” around Philippine civilian and military aircraft
• China has increasingly deployed its largest coast guard ships to contested waters, augmenting its presence.
• According to Crisis Group reports, in 2025 Manila documented 20–22 Chinese research vessels entering its waters — a significant increase over prior years.
• In August 2025, a collision occurred between a Chinese Coast Guard ship and a PLA Navy ship near Scarborough Shoal while pursuing a Philippine Coast Guard vessel. The Chinese CCG vessel was damaged, and Chinese personnel casualties were claimed by the Philippines.
• In early October 2025, China’s coast guard held a national day flag-raising ceremony in waters off Scarborough Shoal, reaffirming its symbolic control.
• Also, Chinese state media have been promoting provocative social media claims, including that Palawan (a Philippine province) was once “Zheng He Island,” presumably to stir narratives of historical Chinese rights. Philippine authorities denounced these claims.
• China’s Island Building, Militarization, and Maritime Militia

• Over the past decade, China has reclaimed land on reefs and built artificial islands in the Spratly and Paracel chains, installing runways, ports, radars, anti-ship missiles, and military infrastructures.
• It maintains ~20 outposts in the Paracels and ~7 in the Spratlys. China’s maritime militia (fishing vessels subsidized and coordinated with maritime security roles) is a key tool for enforcing presence while blurring the line between civilian and security operations.
• The “weaponization” of fisheries is an evolving dynamic: deploying vessels to guard features, intimidate rivals, and assert zone control.
• Philippines’ Defensive Measures, Diplomacy, and Alliances

• The Philippines maintains a small contingent of Marines aboard the grounded BRP Sierra Madre (Second Thomas Shoal), to assert presence. Resupply missions to this outpost are frequent flashpoints.    
• After the 2016 arbitration ruling, Manila sought diplomatic, legal, and alliance-based support to counter Chinese pressure. In July 2024, the Philippines and Japan announced a defense pact amid rising tensions.
• The U.S.–Philippines Mutual Defense Treaty remains a cornerstone; Manila expects U.S. support if an armed attack occurs.
• Philippine defense capabilities remain limited: as of 2024, its air defense inventory included around 12 FA-50 light jet fighters, a few surface-to-air missile systems (e.g. Spyder), and some older anti-air guns. The U.S. has conducted joint exercises (e.g. Balikatan) with the Philippines and increased presence in the region.

Strategic Behavior and Chinese Restraint Patterns

• Interestingly, some observers note China tends to be more restrained toward Vietnam’s expansion, refraining from aggressive interference in Vietnam’s land reclamation in the Spratlys, compared to its posture toward the Philippines.
• In dealings with Manila, China often uses coercive but calibrated tactics (e.g. ramming, water cannons, ship boarding) rather than outright use of force, in order to stay below the threshold of open war. Some analysts argue China wants to gradually wear down Philippine political will and reliance on alliances without triggering full-blown conflict.

Quantitative Snapshot and Statistical Insights

While many aspects are qualitative and security-driven, here are key quantitative estimates:

Indicator	Estimate / Data	Notes / Caveats
Global trade via SCS	~USD 3 trillion annually	Reflects about one-third of global maritime trade.
China’s energy imports via SCS	~80%	A significant fraction of China’s energy supply transits these waters.
Undiscovered oil reserves in SCS	~11 billion barrels	Broad estimate used by multiple studies.
Undiscovered natural gas reserves	~190 trillion cubic feet (tcf)	Similarly, a frequently cited figure.
Reef & fish decline	Fish stocks down 70–95% since 1950s; coral cover declines ~16% per decade	Indicative of major environmental degradation.
Number of Chinese outposts	~20 in Paracels, ~7 in Spratlys	Rough projection from satellite and open sources.
Philippine defense assets (2024)	~12 FA-50 jets, limited SAM, AA guns	Reflects its weaker baseline.
Recorded Chinese “research vessels” in PH waters (2025)	20–22 vessels	Philippine reports of increased activity.
Incidents in 2024 (e.g., collisions, dangerous maneuvers)	Multiple collisions, injuries, boarding events	See qualitative section; no single consistent numerical time-series published.

Note: Because much of maritime coercion is informal or deniable (e.g. maritime militia, “gray zone” tactics), official data underreport the scale. Many collisions or near-misses are disputed by the parties.

 

Analytical Assessment: Drivers, Constraints, and Motivations

Why China Pushes Assertively

1. Strategic Depth and Power Projection
   Controlling the SCS gives China forward depth, strategic sea control, and buffer zones around the southern flank. It allows Beijing to extend anti-access/area-denial (A2/AD) capabilities toward U.S. or allied forces.
2. Natural Resource Access
   Securing rights to undersea oil/gas and fishing resources is economically attractive, though exploitation is currently limited by political risk.
3. Symbolic and Narrative Claims
   The nine-dash line and associated claims help China craft narrative legitimacy of historic rights, national unity, and sovereignty, which are central to its domestic legitimacy.
4. Incrementalism and Risk Management
   China seems to prefer incremental coercion rather than major war — using maritime militia, coast guard, and hybrid tactics to avoid triggering broader conflict while gradually shifting facts on the ground.
5. Testing International Resolve
   By pushing boundaries, China gauges responses from claimants, the U.S., ASEAN, and other external powers, learning where redlines lie.

Constraints and Risks

1. Military Imbalance in Certain Locales
   In direct naval confrontation, China holds stark superiority over claimant states like the Philippines. But localized geography (shoals, reefs) and the coastal defenders’ knowledge create complicating factors.
2. Alliance and External Intervention
   The presence of the U.S. Navy and other powers (Japan, Australia, India) can deter excessive aggression.
3. Diplomatic and Economic Costs
   Aggressive behavior risks damaging China’s global image, relationships with ASEAN, and inviting multilateral counter-coalitions.
4. Escalation Risk and Unintended Conflict
   A miscalculated collision or armed incident could spiral into war, triggering broader geopolitical fallout.
5. Environmental Degradation Backlash
   The destruction of coral reefs and fishing stocks can undermine long-term legitimacy among coastal states dependent on maritime livelihoods.

Why the Philippines (and Others) Push Back

• Sovereign Rights
  Under UNCLOS and the PCA ruling, the Philippines asserts legal rights to exploit resources, regulate fishing, and control access in its EEZ, including around Second Thomas Shoal.
• Domestic Legitimacy
  Philippine leadership is under domestic pressure to defend national territory and not appear weak.
• Alliances for Leverage
  The U.S.–Philippines treaty and new pact with Japan give Manila options for deterrence.
• Legal and Diplomatic Tools
  Manila uses diplomatic protests, public diplomacy, recordings, international forums, and mapping to contest Chinese claims.
• Maritime Presence Strategy
  Resupply missions, fishers venturing into contested zones, and coast guard patrols help maintain presence and signal non-acceptance.

Behavior toward Vietnam and Other Claimants

China’s approach is asymmetric. It tends to escalate more strongly against weaker states like the Philippines, while adopting a more restrained or diplomatic posture toward Vietnam’s expansion efforts. The Chicago Journal of Foreign Policy+4War on the Rocks+4chinaus-icas.org+4In part, this is a recognition of different risk tolerances, military capacities, and diplomatic environments.

 

Case Study: Second Thomas Shoal and Scarborough Shoal

Second Thomas Shoal

The Second Thomas Shoal (Ayungin Shoal) is a submerged reef within the Philippines’ EEZ. The Philippines maintains a grounded warship (BRP Sierra Madre) there since 1999 to shore up its claim. Council on Foreign Relations+3Default+3The Chicago Journal of Foreign Policy+3

Resupply missions to that outpost are regular flashpoints. In 2024, particularly on 17 June, China used ramming, boarding, slashing, and water cannons — causing injuries — to block Philippine supply boats. War on the Rocks+4Wikipedia+4The Chicago Journal of Foreign Policy+4

In 2024, China also issued formal guidelines backing use of lethal force in disputed waters, authorized detention of non-Chinese ships up to 60 days, and issued new enforcement mandates. Quincy Institute+3Wikipedia+3Congress.gov+3

In 2024, Janes reported that between 17 June and 1 November, there were seven interception incidents between Chinese and Philippine vessels — though none escalated to casualties. Default

Analysts view China’s posture at Second Thomas as purposeful coercion to deny or degrade Philippine presence over time, while avoiding outright war. Default+2chinaus-icas.org+2

Scarborough Shoal

·         Scarborough Shoal (Huangyan Dao) is located closer to the Philippines, historically accessed by Filipino fishermen. China has de facto controlled it since 2012, frequently blocking Philippine resupply and fishing access. UI+3Congress.gov+3The Chicago Journal of Foreign Policy+3

·         In August 2025, collisions between Chinese naval and coast guard vessels near Scarborough while pursuing a Philippine vessel heightened tensions. The Chinese side suffered damage. Wikipedia

·         In October 2025, China held a flag-raising ceremony near the shoal, reinforcing symbolic claims. Reuters+1

·         Observers note that Chinese efforts to convert the shoal into a “national nature reserve” may be a tactic to legitimize its control and restrict Philippine access. Reuters+1

 

Future Scenarios to 2030 (or Beyond)

Given current trajectories, the dispute may evolve along several plausible paths. Below are summarized scenarios and their implications.

1. Managed Coercion / Status Quo Escalation

• China continues gradual coercive pressure: stronger coast guard presence, more ramming, shadowing, vessel collisions, and intermittent intimidation, but avoiding direct military confrontation.
• The Philippines responds with diplomatic protests, U.S. naval presence, alliance signaling, and intermittent resupply missions, attempting to avoid escalation.
• Over time, China may erode Philippine presence in outposts through attrition (e.g. wear-and-tear on BRP Sierra Madre, blocking supplies).
• This is perhaps the base-case scenario for the mid-term.

2. Localized Skirmishes / Accidental Escalation

• A collision or misfire in a contested area could accidentally ignite kinetic conflict (e.g. vessel fire, casualties).
• Plausibly, the Philippines would invoke U.S. treaty obligations, prompting U.S. involvement, Chinese counter-moves, and escalation across multiple fronts.
• This scenario is riskier for all parties and could spiral out of control.

3. Negotiated Settlements or Confidence-Building Regime

• Under pressure (ASEAN diplomacy, U.S./Japan mediation, economic costs), China and claimants agree on interim arrangements: joint resource development, maritime codes of conduct, fisheries management, and shared jurisdiction in certain marine zones.
• The 2024 “provisional agreement” between China and the Philippines on limited resupply access to Sierra Madre hints at this direction.
• However, the asymmetry in power and trust deficits make this route challenging.

4. Major Conflict / Wartime Contingency

• In worst case, tensions spiral into naval clashes or air engagements, dragging in external powers such as the U.S., Japan, or Australia.
• This would be extremely damaging to global trade, regional security, and potentially catastrophic for claimant states.
• It is, however, not inevitable: Chinese strategy to date avoids overt war.

5. Greater U.S./Allied Engagement and Deterrence

• The U.S., Japan, Australia, India, and Southeast Asian partners form a more coherent coalition to patrol, deploy naval assets, and publicly challenge coercive behavior.
• Enhanced deterrence could force China to scale back overt aggression and push it toward more diplomatic or legally constrained behavior.
• This scenario depends on political will and resource commitment from external powers.

 

Policy and Strategic Recommendations

Given the stakes, here are suggested policy directions for interested parties (especially the Philippines, ASEAN, and external allies):

1. Strengthen Maritime Domain Awareness (MDA)
• Invest in satellites, unmanned systems (UUVs, drones), radar, and AIS tracking to document incursions reliably.
• Share intelligence across ASEAN, U.S., Japan to build common situational awareness.
2. Legal and Diplomatic Mobilization
• Consistently publicize violations, map incursions, lodge diplomatic protests, and engage in international fora (e.g. UN, arbitration, arbitration interpretive statements).
• Engage ASEAN and non-claimant states to broaden diplomatic pressure.
3. Alliance and Security Partnerships
• Deepen defense cooperation with the U.S., Japan, Australia, India, and other willing partners; conduct joint naval/air exercises.
• Explore rotational presence or basing rights in Philippine territory.
4. Resist Attrition Strategy
• Sustain resupply missions to contested outposts even under harassment, using redundant vessels and routes.
• Maintain a presence by civilian fishing and coast guard patrols (within legality) to assert non-acquiescence.
5. Defensive Capability Enhancement
• Upgrade Philippine naval and air assets (e.g. modern frigates, anti-ship missiles, coastal surveillance).
• Invest in anti-access/area denial (A2/AD) capabilities to complicate Chinese coercion.
6. Environmental and Fisheries Cooperation
• Propose joint fishery zones or co-management zones with claimants and China to reduce fishery conflicts.
• Mobilize environmental actors to document reef damage and push for joint reef restoration.
7. Contingency Planning and Escalation Control
• Define clear rules of engagement, escalation thresholds, and communication hotlines to manage incidents.
• Engage in back-channel diplomacy with China to prevent accidents spiraling.

 

Additional Statistical Analysis (2025 & recent years)

Metric	Data / Trend	Implications & Notes
Vessel presence / “fleet swarms”	Between August 27 and September 2, 2024, the Philippine Navy reported 203 Chinese vessels (including maritime militia, coast guard, and warships) in the West Philippine Sea, around several disputed features.	Demonstrates increased frequency and scale of Chinese maritime presence; used as a pressure/harassment tactic. The number is significantly higher than prior comparable periods, marking escalation.
Trade volume through the SCS	~1/3 of global maritime trade passes through South China Sea. Also, in 2023, of the approx. 76 million barrels/day of oil product shipped globally by sea, about 28 million barrels/day (≈37%) traversed the SCS	Underlines how vital the SCS is to global energy supply chains and trade flows. Disruption would have wide economic ripple effects.
Trade between China & ASEAN	In 1Q 2025, ASEAN accounted for 16.6% of China’s total foreign trade volume. Total trade with ASEAN in that quarter was ~1.71 trillion yuan (US$≈234.17 billion), up 7.1% YoY.	Shows ASEAN’s growing importance to China, and conversely how ASEAN states are deeply affected by any SCS instability.
Decline of fish stocks & coral reefs	Fish stocks in contested waters are reduced to 5%–30% of their 1950s levels. r Coral reefs: ~6,200 acres destroyed directly via island building and another ~16,553 acres lost to giant clam harvesting. Reefs’ decline is ~16% per decade; if that continues, 90% could be gone by 2050.	Signals ecological tipping point. Loss of biodiversity, fish stock collapse, and disruption of livelihoods, as well as loss of maritime environmental services (coastal protection, tourism etc.).
Fishing species under threat	Skipjack tuna: Overfishing of juveniles; scientists warn of “rapid population decline” if current practices continue. Mackerel Scad: data‐poor assessment shows stock decline, especially because many juveniles are caught (length‐based study shows lower spawning potential ratio). Minimum length at maturity around 24.29 cm; many caught below that	Early‐warning of collapse of important commercial stocks. Underscores need for regional cooperation in fisheries management, regulation on mesh size, seasonal bans etc.
Maritime Incident Counts	In October 2024, 78 “maritime incidents” recorded in the South China Sea area of interest (IFC’s AOI). I Within those, 31 were illegal, unreported, or unregulated fishing (IUUF) incidents (36 fishing vessels) in that month.	Shows that even independent of big clashes, everyday “lower intensity” incidents are numerous — contributing to tension, economic loss, and cumulative environmental damage.

 

South China Sea and India

1. Strategic Importance for India

• Energy & Trade Routes:
• Nearly 55% of India’s trade (by value) passes through the South China Sea, including vital energy imports from the Middle East and Africa heading to East Asia.
• The SCS is a critical choke point in India’s “Act East” policy and Indo-Pacific strategy.
• Sea Lines of Communication (SLOCs): Freedom of navigation in SCS directly affects India’s economic security. Any Chinese attempt to control or restrict passage would be detrimental.

 

2. India’s Policy & Diplomatic Stand

• UNCLOS-based stance: India supports the 2016 Hague Tribunal ruling rejecting China’s Nine-Dash Line.
• India consistently stresses that disputes must be settled peacefully through international law.
• India avoids direct involvement in sovereignty disputes but opposes unilateral changes to status quo.

 

3. India’s Actions in the Region

• Naval Presence:
• Indian Navy regularly deploys ships for exercises and goodwill visits to Vietnam, the Philippines, Indonesia, and Malaysia.
• MALABAR Naval Exercise (India, U.S., Japan, Australia) often projects presence in the wider Indo-Pacific.
• Oil Exploration:
• India’s ONGC Videsh Ltd. has oil exploration projects with Vietnam in blocks that lie within Vietnam’s EEZ — areas that China also claims. China has protested these.
• Defense Partnerships:
• India has deepened defense cooperation with Vietnam (submarine training, BrahMos missile deal in 2023–24).
• Joint patrols and naval dialogues with the Philippines and Indonesia have increased since 2023.

 

4. China Factor & Security Concerns

• String of Pearls vs. Act East: While China expands presence in the Indian Ocean (ports in Gwadar, Hambantota, Djibouti), India increases visibility in the South China Sea. This is part of the larger India–China maritime rivalry.
• Quad Alignment: India, U.S., Japan, and Australia coordinate to ensure “Free and Open Indo-Pacific,” with the SCS as a focal point.
• Military Balance: India does not aim for confrontation but signals its role as a security provider in the Indo-Pacific, countering China’s narrative.

 

5. Economic & Ecological Stakes

• Trade Diversification: Stable SCS means smoother trade to ASEAN, which is now India’s fourth-largest trading partner (~$131 billion in FY2023–24).
• Energy Security: India imports LNG from Southeast Asia and invests in SCS exploration, making stability crucial.
• Fisheries & Blue Economy: Though less direct, ecological collapse in SCS affects Indian Ocean fish migration, adding indirect stress on Indian fisheries.

 

6. Challenges for India

• Limited naval capacity compared to China’s massive PLA Navy.
• ASEAN divisions: some states welcome India’s presence, others stay quiet under Chinese influence.
• Balancing relations: India has economic interdependence with China (>$135 billion bilateral trade in 2023), yet needs to resist Beijing’s assertiveness.

 

7. Future Outlook

• India will continue supporting ASEAN centrality and freedom of navigation.
• Likely more defense exports to Southeast Asia (BrahMos, patrol vessels).
• India’s role in Quad and trilateral groupings (with Japan–Philippines, Vietnam–Japan) may deepen.
• SCS will remain a test ground for India’s “net security provider” image in the Indo-Pacific.

 

Comparative Analysis: South China Sea – India, China, and U.S.

Aspect	India	China	United States
Core Interest	Protecting trade routes, energy security, supporting UNCLOS, balancing China	Sovereignty claims under “Nine-Dash Line,” resource control, military dominance	Freedom of navigation, maintaining global maritime order, containing China
Trade Dependence on SCS	~55% of India’s trade passes through SCS	Internal trade less reliant; uses SCS as leverage over others	~$1.2 trillion U.S. trade passes through Indo-Pacific annually (significant SCS portion)
Military Presence	Limited deployments; goodwill visits, joint exercises (e.g., MALABAR)	Largest presence: PLA Navy, Coast Guard, Maritime Militia; 3,200+ acres reclaimed & militarized	Frequent “Freedom of Navigation Operations” (FONOPs); carrier strike groups patrol regularly
Energy & Resources	ONGC Videsh exploration projects with Vietnam; energy imports cross SCS	Seeks to exploit ~11 billion barrels of oil & 190 trillion cubic feet of natural gas	Secures supply chains for allies (Japan, S. Korea, Philippines); energy security for region
Alliances & Partnerships	Strengthening ties with Vietnam, Philippines, Indonesia; Quad cooperation	Prefers bilateral talks with ASEAN states to dilute opposition; close ties with Cambodia, Laos	Mutual Defense Treaty with Philippines; security alliances with Japan, S. Korea, Australia; Quad & AUKUS
Legal/Political Stance	Supports UNCLOS, rejects unilateral changes; backs 2016 Tribunal ruling	Rejects 2016 Tribunal ruling; promotes “historical rights” narrative	Supports UNCLOS, insists on lawful maritime order, rejects China’s claims
Strategic Goal	Counterbalance China in Indo-Pacific, project as “net security provider”	Establish de facto control of SCS, push U.S. & allies out of region	Contain China’s rise, ensure open seas, reassure Asian allies
Recent Actions (2023–2025)	BrahMos missile export to Philippines & Vietnam, naval drills with ASEAN, India–Philippines defense agreement talks	June 2024: attack on Philippine resupply boat; Sept 2024: 203-ship “swarm” in WPS	Expanded U.S.–Philippines EDCA bases (9 sites), joint patrols with Manila & Tokyo, stronger QUAD posture

 

🔹 Quick Insights

• India = “Stakeholder, not claimant” → Protecting trade & energy, balancing China via soft power, defense exports, and naval presence.
• China = “Claimant & Aggressor” → Aims for full control, rejects UNCLOS, militarizes islands, uses coercion.
• U.S. = “Global Policeman” → Not a claimant, but ensures freedom of navigation, allies’ protection, and check on Chinese hegemony.

U.S. Activities in the South China Sea

1. Freedom of Navigation Operations (FONOPs)

• The U.S. Navy conducts regular FONOPs to challenge China’s excessive maritime claims.
• These operations involve warships sailing within 12 nautical miles of disputed features (e.g., Spratly Islands, Paracel Islands).
• Objective: Demonstrate that SCS is international waters, not China’s territorial sea.

 

2. Military Deployments

• Carrier Strike Groups (CSGs): U.S. aircraft carriers like USS Ronald Reagan and USS Carl Vinson frequently transit the SCS.
• Bomber Flights: B-52 and B-1B bombers have conducted deterrent patrols over the SCS.
• Submarine Operations: Nuclear-powered submarines are regularly deployed, though details are often classified.
• Joint Patrols: Since 2023–24, the U.S. has conducted joint naval patrols with the Philippines and Japan in the West Philippine Sea.

 

3. Defense Partnerships and Bases

• Philippines:
• Under the Enhanced Defense Cooperation Agreement (EDCA), the U.S. now has access to 9 Philippine bases (expanded in 2023).
• U.S. troops, logistics hubs, and prepositioned defense assets strengthen deterrence against China.
• Japan & Australia: Coordinated patrols and trilateral drills in the SCS.
• Vietnam: Although not a formal ally, U.S. warships have made port calls in Vietnam, signaling support.

 

4. Military Exercises

• RIMPAC (Rim of the Pacific): World’s largest naval exercise, with some drills focusing on SCS scenarios.
• BALIKATAN (Philippines–U.S. joint exercise): 2023 edition was the largest ever, involving over 17,000 troops, live-fire drills near disputed waters, and HIMARS missile deployment.
• Quad Naval Drills: With India, Japan, and Australia — often focused on Indo-Pacific maritime security, including SCS.

 

5. Diplomatic & Strategic Actions

• Official Position: U.S. rejects China’s Nine-Dash Line claims, supports 2016 Tribunal ruling.
• Mutual Defense Treaty (1951) with Philippines: U.S. confirmed in 2023–24 that any attack on Philippine vessels in the SCS will trigger U.S. defense obligations.
• Economic & Security Frameworks: Indo-Pacific Economic Framework (IPEF), AUKUS (with UK & Australia), and Quad — all indirectly aimed at containing China’s dominance in SCS.

 

6. Recent Developments (2023–2025)

• 2023: U.S. expanded EDCA bases in the Philippines; increased arms aid to Manila.
• 2024: Following China’s attack on a Philippine resupply boat (June), U.S. sent warships to escort Philippine convoys.
• 2025: Intensified U.S.–Japan–Philippines trilateral patrols, explicitly signaling readiness to counter Chinese aggression at Second Thomas Shoal.

 

✅ Key Line for Your Article:
The U.S. sees the South China Sea not just as contested Asian waters, but as the frontline of great power competition, where freedom of navigation, alliance credibility, and the global balance of power are at stake.

Timeline of U.S. Activities in the South China Sea (2016–2025)

·         2016: U.S. supports the Hague Tribunal ruling in favor of the Philippines, rejecting China’s Nine-Dash Line. Begins more assertive FONOPs.

·         2017–2018: Increased Freedom of Navigation Operations (FONOPs); carrier strike groups regularly deployed to SCS.

·         2019: U.S. labels China’s island-building as “illegal militarization.” Regular bomber patrols (B-52s) fly over SCS.

·         2020: Amid COVID-19, U.S. Navy emphasizes “unbroken presence” in SCS; USS Nimitz and USS Ronald Reagan operate together in rare dual-carrier drill.

·         2021: U.S. reaffirms defense commitments to the Philippines; escalates joint exercises in SCS with Quad nations.

·         2022: U.S. enhances security ties with Vietnam and Indonesia; first joint maritime patrols in SCS with regional partners.

·         2023: Enhanced Defense Cooperation Agreement (EDCA) with the Philippines expands U.S. access to 9 military bases. Largest-ever Balikatan Exercise with 17,000 troops near Taiwan-facing coasts.

·         2024:

o    June: China attacks Philippine resupply mission at Second Thomas Shoal → U.S. deploys naval escorts.

o    September: Joint patrols with Philippines and Japan in West Philippine Sea.

o    U.S. reiterates Mutual Defense Treaty will cover Philippine vessels under attack.

·         2025:

o    Expanded trilateral patrols with Japan and the Philippines.

o    More frequent U.S. Navy submarine and aircraft deployments.

o    U.S. positions itself as direct guarantor of Philippine sovereignty in disputed waters.

Closing Remarks

The South China Sea is not just an Asian dispute — it is the epicenter of global maritime security, trade, and power rivalry.

·         For China, it is about historical claims, resources, and asserting dominance.

·         For the Philippines and ASEAN, it is about survival, sovereignty, and economic lifelines.

·         For the U.S., it is about keeping seas open, defending allies, and containing China’s rise.

·         For India, it is about ensuring trade security and balancing China in the wider Indo-Pacific.

The future of the South China Sea will determine whether the Indo-Pacific remains a zone of lawful order and cooperation, or drifts into a battlefield of coercion and conflict. What is certain is that its ripples will be felt far beyond Asia — shaping global trade, security, and diplomacy for decades to come.

 

References and sources for the statistical and factual data above.

 

·         China swamps West Philippine Sea with 203 ships — reports of large Chinese fleet presence near several shoals.

·         Inquirer.net reporting — about the 203 Chinese vessels recorded between August-27 and September-2, 2024.

·         CSIS / ChinaPower “How much trade transits the South China Sea?” — trade volume fraction, importance of SCS for global trade.

·         U.S. Energy Information Administration (EIA) / maritime trade & petroleum flows — stats on barrels/day through SCS.

·         China-ASEAN trade statistics, Q1 2025 — from China’s General Administration of Customs.

·         Stimson Center report: “Militarized Commons: How Territorial Competition is Weaponizing Fisheries and Destroying the South China Sea” — fish stock decline, reef losses, etc.

·         :

·         “The initial assessment of an important pelagic fish, Mackerel Scad …” (Wiley / Marine & Coastal Fisheries) Report on skipjack tuna under threat from SCMP (working group of scientists from several SCS claimant states)

·         IFC (Information Fusion Centre) monthly report October 2024 — for Maritime Incidents / IUUF incidents.