War & Ripples: How the Russia–Ukraine Conflict Reshaped India — and the World (A data-driven outlook, 2024–2030)

 War & Ripples: How the Russia–Ukraine Conflict Reshaped India — and the World (A data-driven outlook, 2024–2030)

 Sub-title

: From grain and gas to geopolitics and growth — how a European war rewired global markets and India’s strategy (with data, projections and policy takeaways).

 

Executive summary (quick view)

The Russia–Ukraine war has been more than a European security crisis — it has been a multi-dimensional shock affecting energy, food, fertilizers, trade chains, defence budgets, and geopolitics worldwide. For India the impact has been a paradox: higher short-term costs and supply risks, but also strategic opportunities (discounted energy and fertilizer supplies, expanded refining and export capacity, and deepening strategic ties). Globally, the war accelerated inflationary pressures, raised energy security concerns, pushed military spending higher, disrupted grain flows and highlighted fragility in globalisation. The next five–six years (2025–2030) will see lingering structural adjustments — diversification of suppliers, altered trade partnerships, a faster shift in energy investments, and higher defence outlays — with meaningful implications for policy makers and businesses. (Key sources: IMF/WEO, World Bank, IEA, FAO, SIPRI, Reuters).

 

1. The macroeconomic picture: global slowdown, higher uncertainty

Since the outbreak of large-scale hostilities, the global economy has faced three interacting problems: (1) commodity shocks (energy and food), (2) sanctions and re-routing of trade, and (3) risk premia that raised borrowing costs and reduced investment. The IMF’s World Economic Outlook has repeatedly highlighted that the war is one of the major downside risks to growth and inflation dynamics since 2022; growth projections were revised downward in the years following the invasion as inflation and tightening financial conditions took a toll.

The World Bank’s Global Economic Prospects reinforces this: the post-pandemic recovery has been uneven and geopolitical fragmentation has reduced policy space for many emerging economies — producing a forecast of slower average growth through the mid-2020s and elevated downside risks.

Implication for 2024–2030: expect lower trend growth (relative to the 2010s), persistent inflationary episodes linked to commodity disruptions, and higher borrowing costs for emerging markets — especially those heavily reliant on imported energy, food, or fertilizers.

 

2. Energy shock and India’s strategy: short-term pain, strategic gains

The shock

Russia is a major exporter of crude oil, refined products and natural gas. Western sanctions, rerouting of flows, and new trade corridors altered global energy balances — raising prices intermittently and forcing consumers and refiners to find alternatives. The International Energy Agency’s 2024–2025 assessments show that European energy security became a priority, Asian gas demand rose, and global LNG and crude flows were re-priced and rerouted in response to the crisis.

India’s position

India stepped into the gap in two visible ways:

• Oil & refining: Indian refiners purchased discounted Russian crude, which allowed refiners to run at higher throughput and — in some quarters — increase fuel exports. Reuters reported India’s fuel exports surging to multi-year highs, aided in part by processing of discounted Russian crude and rising ethanol blending. This created short-term refining profits and enlarged India’s role as a fuels exporter
• Fertilizers & edible oils: Russia expanded its exports of fertilizers and edible oils to markets including India, helping shield Indian agriculture from the worst supply shocks even as global fertilizer markets remained geopolitically tense. Reports in 2024–2025 show Russia increasing fertilizer and sunflower oil pushes to India.
• Implication for 2024–2030: India will likely continue to use strategic purchases (discounted oil, fertilizers, edible oils) as a short-term hedge and an industrial opportunity, while also investing in refining capacity and storage. Over 2026–2030, expect India to accelerate diversification (LNG terminals, green energy investments) to reduce exposure to volatile fossil-fuel markets.

 

3. Food security & agriculture: Ukraine’s grain gap and global knock-on effects

Ukraine’s rich grain output historically underpins food supplies to Africa, the Middle East and parts of Asia. The war damaged planting and logistics: FAO’s country briefs indicate cereal production in Ukraine in 2024 was substantially below pre-war averages (cited: ~20% below average in 2024) and export volumes for 2024/25 remained below pre-war levels. Disruptions to Black Sea routes increased shipping costs and insurance premia, raising global grain prices periodically

For India — a major food producer but a net importer of some edible oils and fertilizers — the impact was twofold:

1. Global grain markets: increased volatility kept food inflation elevated in many countries, hurt importers in Africa and Asia, and shifted trade routes (more grain transiting via EU ports and rail corridors
2. Fertilizers & edible oils: disruptions in Ukraine and Western sanctions on Russia initially created shortages and price spikes. Russia’s pivot to increase fertilizer and edible oil sales to non-Western markets (including India) helped partially close the gap, but geopolitical dependency created policy dilemmas for India’s procurement strategy.

Implication for 2024–2030: Food price volatility should moderate as supply channels adapt (rail corridors, alternative suppliers, rebuilding of Ukrainian capacity), but structural risks remain. India will likely strengthen buffer stocks, invest in port/logistics resilience for edible oils, and seek longer-term fertilizer self-reliance or diversified supply contracts.

 

4. Trade, supply chains, and the fragmentation of globalization

The war accelerated “friend-shoring” and regionalisation: firms and states reassessed supply-chain risks, sometimes reshoring critical goods or seeking alternate low-risk partners. Global institutions warn that trade fragmentation reduces the efficiency gains of global value chains and increases costs.

For India, the trade effect is mixed:

• Opportunity: re-routing of trade and Western firms’ search for alternative suppliers opens markets for Indian manufacturing and services (electronics assembly, pharma, textiles).
• Challenge: higher freight, insurance and input costs (rare-earths, food, energy components) raise production costs and inflationary pass-through.

Implication for 2024–2030: India can capture near-term export opportunities but must invest in logistics, standards, quality and industrial policy to sustain market share amid global reconfiguration.

 

5. Defence spending and strategic realignments

The war produced a sharp, measurable rise in global military expenditure: SIPRI’s 2024 data shows an unprecedented rise in world military spending, with Europe and other regions raising budgets in response to the conflict. Global military expenditure rose steeply in 2024, reversing a decade of stagnation.

India’s strategic calculus has been affected in the following ways:

• Acquisitions & force readiness: increased emphasis on acquisitions, readiness, and force modernisation to manage multiple security vectors.
• Defence diplomacy: deeper engagement with multiple partners — expanded ties with Russia (hardware, maintenance), while simultaneously strengthening ties with Western suppliers, Quad partners and domestic defence manufacturing.

Implication for 2024–2030: Expect elevated defence budgets across Asia and Europe through the latter half of the decade. India will continue a multi-vector procurement strategy and accelerate “Make in India” defence initiatives to reduce reliance on single suppliers.

 

6. Finance, sanctions, and currency flows

Sanctions and secondary sanctions on Russian entities forced changes in payment systems, banking relationships and foreign-exchange routes. Many businesses re-priced risks, shifted invoicing currencies and adjusted reserve strategies. For emerging markets, increased risk premia and higher borrowing costs in 2023–2024 constrained fiscal space and investment capacity. IMF and World Bank analyses tie such geopolitical shocks to slower growth and tighter financial conditions globally.

India’s financial footprint adjusted in two ways:

• Trade invoicing & payments: creative use of third-country routes, rupee-denominated trade and growth in non-Western payment channels for some transactions.
• Reserves & sovereign risk: Reserve management became more cautious given higher global volatility; capital flows were sensitive to global risk episodes.

Implication for 2024–2030: India will continue to build resilience in payment rails, diversify reserve holdings, and expand currency swap lines — while the global financial system will likely remain segmented around sanction regimes.

 

7. Human cost & displacement: global humanitarian footprint

The human toll — refugees, internally displaced people and humanitarian needs — amplified global burden sharing. OECD and UN reporting show millions affected in Ukraine and upwards of several million needing humanitarian assistance in the region in 2024–2025. While the immediate refugee flows were into Europe, the secondary humanitarian pressures (food shortages, reduced export revenues for some African and Asian importers) were real and measurable.

Implication for 2024–2030: Protracted humanitarian needs require durable funding mechanisms. India’s role has been primarily diplomatic and trade oriented (e.g., imports, bilateral aid), but global humanitarian stress highlights the need for stronger multilateral coordination.

 

8. Scenario analysis 2024–2030 (data-driven projections)

Below are three plausible scenarios for the medium term, summarised with expected outcomes for India and the world. (These are scenarios — not forecasts — and combine observed 2024–2025 trends in the cited sources with reasonable conditional logic.)

Scenario A — Managed de-escalation & reconstruction (baseline-optimistic)

• Global: Ukraine gradually re-integrates into export markets by 2026–2027; energy markets stabilise; global growth recovers modestly by 2026.
• India: benefits from stable energy imports, converts refinery gains into forward investments, and uses cheaper fertilizer flows temporarily while investing in domestic capacity.
• Data cue: FAO shows gradual return of Ukrainian export capacity; IEA indicates stabilising gas markets.

Scenario B — Protracted conflict with periodic shocks (most likely)

• Global: recurrent commodity price spikes, persistent higher defence spending, slower global trade integration. IMF and World Bank risk assessments point to this as a material risk to growth and inflation.
• India: periodic windfalls (discounted Russian oil) but also recurring inflation and supply risks; stronger push into strategic stockpiles and diversification.

Scenario C — Geopolitical fragmentation deepens (downside)

• Global: sustained fragmentation of trade and finance channels; higher structural costs; investment slows across emerging markets. SIPRI’s military expenditure trends and continued sanctions dynamics point to higher geopolitical costs.
• India: strategic stress — increased defence costs, tougher choices on partners, accelerated domestic industrial policies.

 

9. Policy recommendations for India (actionable, near-term to 2030)

1. Energy diversification: accelerate LNG import capacity, strategic petroleum reserves, and renewables (solar/wind + storage) to reduce exposure to fossil volatility. Use short-term Russian supplies strategically but prioritize domestic resilience.
2. Agricultural resilience: expand buffer stocks, invest in edible-oil refining/port capacity, and support domestic fertilizer production / recycling to reduce import dependency. FAO data on Ukraine shows why alternative sourcing is a national security matter.
3. Trade and industrial policy: invest in logistics, standards and quality to capture market share from re-oriented supply chains; negotiate long-term supply contracts with multiple partners.
4. Defence & diplomacy: maintain a balanced, multi-vector procurement and deepen defence industrialisation with clear offset, transfer and local-manufacturing goals. SIPRI shows defence spending upward pressure is persistent.
5. Financial resilience: strengthen payment rails (rupee-trade frameworks, swap lines), expand FX buffers and stress-test public finances against commodity shocks. IMF’s guidance on macro-stability is relevant.

 

10. What businesses and educators should prepare for (practical takeaways)

• Firms: price volatility risk management (hedging), supplier diversification, nearshoring options, and contingency logistics (multi-port routing).
• Financial institutions: scenario stress tests for commodity price shocks and geopolitical risk premia.
• Universities and training: curriculum updates on geopolitical risk, supply-chain design and energy transition economics — to prepare managers for a more fragmented but opportunity-rich global economy.

Table 1: Global Economic Impact of Russia–Ukraine War (2022–2025, with projections till 2030)

Year	Global GDP Growth (%)	Global Inflation (%)	Oil Price (US$/barrel avg)	Natural Gas Price (Europe, €/MWh)	Global Food Price Index (FAO, 2014=100)
2021	6.3	3.2	71	47	125
2022	3.5	8.7	100	120	143
2023	3.0	6.8	83	55	136
2024	2.9	5.9	82	45	131
2025*	3.1 (proj.)	5.3 (proj.)	80	40	129
2030*	3.2 (proj.)	3.5 (proj.)	75	35	122

*Projections (IMF, World Bank, IEA, FAO data-based)

1️⃣ Global Economic Impact Table

• Shockwave 2022: Global GDP dipped from 6.3% (2021) to 3.5% (2022), while inflation more than doubled (3.2% → 8.7%). Oil and gas prices spiked due to energy weaponization by Russia.
• 2023–24 recovery: Prices moderated, but food inflation stayed high — especially cereals and edible oils.
• Outlook 2030: Growth stabilizes (~3.2%), inflation eases, but geopolitical risk premium on energy remains.
• ✅ For India: Discounted Russian oil insulated inflation, giving it a growth edge vs EU/US.

 

⚡ Table 2: Defense Spending Surge Post-War (Top 5 NATO + Russia + China)

Country	2021 Defense Spending (US$ bn)	2024 Defense Spending (US$ bn)	Change (%)	Projection 2030 (US$ bn)
USA	801	860	+7%	980
Russia	66	109	+65%	130
China	293	315	+7%	400
Germany	52	68	+31%	95
UK	59	67	+14%	85
France	56	66	+18%	82
Poland	13	31	+138%	50

2️⃣ Defense Spending Surge Table

• NATO states boosted spending massively (Germany +31%, Poland +138%). Russia increased by 65% despite sanctions.
• China expanded slowly, but consistently, signaling long-term competition.
• ✅ For India:
• More room to bargain defense deals with both Russia and Western partners.
• Make in India defense push gets external validation as countries diversify.

 

🥖 Table 3: Food & Fertilizer Supply Disruptions

Commodity	Russia–Ukraine Share of World Market (2021)	Price Increase 2022 (%)	Status 2024	Projection 2030
Wheat	28%	+45%	Moderated	Stabilizing
Corn	17%	+25%	Moderated	Normalizing
Sunflower Oil	70%	+60%	High Volatile	Diversified
Fertilizers (Urea)	15%	+75%	Still high	Green alt. rising
Potash	20%	+90%	High	Partial recovery

3️⃣ Food & Fertilizer Disruptions Table

• Wheat, corn, and sunflower oil shock hit poorer nations hardest.
• Fertilizer (urea, potash) costs stayed high due to supply cuts.
• ✅ For India: Early deals with Russia/Belarus secured fertilizer imports → avoided a food crisis and stabilized rural inflation.

 

💳 Table 4: Financial Market Side Effects

Indicator	2021	2022	2023	2024	Projection 2030
Global FDI Flows (US$ trillion)	1.65	1.3	1.4	1.45	1.8
Global Trade Growth (%)	10.1	5.1	3.0	3.2	3.8
World Debt/GDP (%)	97	102	100	98	92
SWIFT Cut-offs (Russia banks %)	0	70	75	75	80

 

 

 

4️⃣ Financial Market Side-Effects Table

• FDI flows shrank in 2022 but are rebounding; global trade slowed.
• SWIFT sanctions isolated Russia, accelerating alternatives.
• ✅ For India:
• Opportunity to build Rupee-based trade settlements.
• IT exports gained as global firms diversified from Russia/Ukraine service centers.
• Bond market benefited from emerging market capital inflows seeking stability.

 

✨ Synthesis

• Global pain → India’s relative gain:
• While the world faced energy inflation, India leveraged discounted Russian oil.
• While fertilizers were scarce, India secured them early.
• While supply chains broke, India gained outsourcing/export opportunities.

In short, India turned crisis into opportunity, using its geopolitical balancing act to benefit economically, diplomatically, and strategically.

 

🇮🇳 Positive Impacts on India (Russia–Ukraine War)

📊 Table: India’s Gains from the War

Sector / Dimension	Pre-War (2021)	War-Time Peak (2022–23)	Current (2024–25)	Projection 2030	Positive Impact
Crude Oil Imports (Russia)	<2% of total	~30% of total imports	~40% of imports	25–30%	Huge cost savings due to discounts
Fertilizer Imports (Russia+Belarus)	~8 MT	12 MT	14 MT	16 MT	Ensured food security, price stability
Refinery Exports (Diesel/Petrol to EU)	US$ 28 bn	US$ 44 bn	US$ 47 bn	US$ 60 bn	Export windfall, forex inflows
Trade with Russia	US$ 9 bn	US$ 40 bn	US$ 52 bn	US$ 70 bn	Deepening economic ties
Defense Procurement	60% dependency	65%	62%	50% (due to Make in India)	Short-term access + long-term diversification
INR Internationalization	Limited	Began rupee settlement	Expanding	Wider adoption	Supports de-dollarization
IT & Outsourcing Exports	US$ 150 bn	US$ 180 bn	US$ 200 bn	US$ 280 bn	Global “China+1” & “Russia sanctions gap” gave India advantage

Defense Spending Surge (2021 vs 2024)

• Observation:
• NATO powers (Germany +31%, Poland +138%) rapidly scaled up.
• Russia (+65%) kept pace despite sanctions.
• China grew steadily, preparing long-term competition.
• Interpretation: The war triggered a global arms race. For India, this validates defense modernization and creates opportunities to source, co-produce, and export arms under Make in India.

 

Global GDP vs India GDP Growth (2021–2030)

• Observation:
• Global GDP growth collapsed after the war (2022: 3.5%), stabilizing around 3% by 2030.
• India outperformed consistently (6.7–7.3% in 2022–24), though gradually moderating to ~5.6% by 2030.
• Interpretation: India leveraged discounted energy and resilient domestic demand to outgrow the global slowdown, strengthening its relative position.

 

⃣ Oil Discount Impact on India’s Trade Balance (2021–2025)

• Observation:
• Russia’s share in India’s crude imports jumped from <2% (2021) to ~40% (2024).
• Despite a widening trade deficit, energy import bills were cushioned due to Russian discounts, preventing worse fiscal pressure.
• Interpretation: India converted the crisis into a strategic advantage by buying cheap oil, refining it, and exporting fuels to Europe/Asia, boosting forex inflows.

 

11. Limitations & sources

This article synthesises public data and reports (IMF World Economic Outlook; World Bank Global Economic Prospects; IEA World Energy Outlook and Gas Market Report; FAO country briefs on Ukraine; SIPRI military expenditure reports; news coverage from Reuters and specialist analyses). The situation remains dynamic: evolving diplomatic steps, sanctions regimes, and on-the-ground agricultural recovery in Ukraine can change the outlook materially.

Selected key sources used in this article

• International Monetary Fund — World Economic Outlook (various issues). IMF
• World Bank — Global Economic Prospects. World Bank
• International Energy Agency — World Energy Outlook 2024; Gas Market Report Q3-2024
• Food & Agriculture Organization (FAO) — Ukraine country briefs (2024–2025).
• SIPRI — Trends in World Military Expenditure 2024 (published 2025).
• Reuters reporting: India fuel exports and Russia–India commodity ties (2024–2025). Research articles and policy pieces on fertilizer and Global South impacts (selected).

12. Closing Remarks

The Russia–Ukraine war has shaken the global order in ways unseen since the Cold War. It disrupted supply chains, pushed inflation to historic highs, ignited a defense-spending race, and deepened geopolitical fault lines. For much of the world, the war has been a story of economic pain and political instability.

Yet for India, the war created paradoxical opportunities. By striking a careful diplomatic balance, India accessed discounted energy, secured fertilizers, and expanded its exports of refined fuels. Its IT and service exports grew as companies sought stability away from Eastern Europe. Meanwhile, India’s defense sector gained both urgency and global validation, aligning with the “Atmanirbhar Bharat” (self-reliant India) vision.

The larger lesson is that in a multipolar, crisis-driven world, resilience and adaptability matter more than rigid alignments. Where others saw chaos, India found levers to strengthen growth, fortify food and energy security, and project strategic confidence. By 2030, the true test will be whether India converts these short-term war gains into long-term structural strengths — cleaner energy, modernized defense, and global trade leadership.